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RECORD OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
REGARDING THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

(ORIGINAL)

1st October 1930

RECORD OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL
REGARDING THE IMPERIAL RATIFICATION OF
THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930

The Conference met at 10:25 a.m. on Wednesday, October 1st, 1930.

H. M. The Emperor was present.

ATTENDANCE:

President KURATOMI
Vice President HIRANUMA

State Ministers:

Prime Minister HAMAGUCHI	No. 4
Navy Minister TAKARANE	No. 5
Foreign Minister SHIDEMARA	No. 6
Railway Minister EGI	No. 7
Justice Minister WATANABE	No. 8
Finance Minister INOUE	No. 9
Commerce and Industry Minister TANAKA	No. 10
Home Minister ADACHI	No. 11
Agriculture and Forestry Minister MICHIDA	No. 12
Overseas Minister MATSUDA	No. 13
Education Minister TANAKA	No. 15
Temporary Acting War Minister ABE	No. 16

Councillors:

Councillor ITO	No. 18
Councillor KAMEKO	No. 20
Councillor KOBORI	No. 21
Councillor TOMII	No. 22
Councillor ISHIGURO	No. 23
Councillor YAMAKATA	No. 24
Councillor YURUDA	No. 25
Councillor FURUTSCHI	No. 26
Councillor MATSUOKA	No. 27
Councillor EGI	No. 28
Councillor SAKURAI	No. 29
Councillor DEN	No. 30
Councillor ARAI	No. 31
Councillor KAWAI	No. 32
Councillor KAWATA	No. 34

Councillor SUZUKI	No. 35
Councillor ISHII	No. 36
Councillor MIZUMACHI	No. 37
Councillor OKADA	No. 38
Councillor FUKUTA	No. 39

Absentees:

Imperial Princes:	
Prince YASUHITO	No. 1
Prince NORUHITO	No. 2
Prince KOTOHITO	No. 3

State Minister:	
Communications Minister KOIZUMI	No. 14

Councillor KUKI	No. 19
Councillor ISHIMURA	No. 32

GOVERNMENT DELEGATES:

Director of the Bureau of Legislation KAWASAKI
 Councillor of the Bureau of Legislation KANAMORI
 Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs YOSHIDA
 Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Office MATSUNAGA
 Chief of the Bureau of European and American Affairs of
 the Foreign Office HOTTA
 Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Office SAITO
 Secretary of the Foreign Office YAMAGATA
 Secretary of the Foreign Office SHIOZAKI
 Administrative Official of the Foreign Office FUKUDA
 Administrative Official of the Foreign Office YAMADA
 Vice Minister of Navy KOBAYASHI
 Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau HORI
 Secretary of the Navy Department ENOMOTO
 Captain SHIMOMURA
 Captain IWANURA
 Commander FUSIRA

Reporter:

Chief of the Judging Committee ITO

Chief Secretary:

Chief Secretary FUTAGAMI

Secretaries:

Secretary HORIE
 Secretary MUFO

President (KURATOMI): The meeting will now come to order. As has been previously notified, "The Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930" is brought up for discussion. According to precedent, we shall omit the readings and the subject shall be debated on general principles. The recitation will be omitted and we shall ask the Chief of the Investigation Committee to make a report.

Reporter (ITO): Upon being appointed members of the Investigation Committee concerning the ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930, which is now being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, we have been fully aware of the great importance attached to the situation, and have been destined to give our fullest deliberation upon the matter. Ever since August 18, we have held frequent meetings, listening to explanations in detail from the Ministers of State, and repeatedly deliberating on the matter with each member expressing his respective opinion; thereby we have aimed at achieving complete thoroughness in our investigation.

First, allow me to relate to you the origin of the treaty. The naval armament limitation treaty concluded among Japan, Britain, U. S., France and Italy at the Washington Conference in February 1922, (Taisho 11) had prescribed limitations for total tonnage of capital warships and aircraft carriers to be maintained by each nation, as well as the limitations of tonnage of single warships and the size of mounted guns. As regards auxiliary vessels, however, the treaty had only prescribed limitations for the tonnage of single ships and of the calibre of mounted guns, and did not prescribe any limitation for the total tonnages to be maintained by the respective powers. Accordingly, not more than a few years after the Conference, there is already a tendency among leading Naval Powers for marked competition in building auxiliary vessels. The League of Nations, according to its mission, has made repeated efforts to realize general disarmament of army, navy and air forces alike. But in view of the extent of the sphere of discussion there was a wide difference of opinion among the Powers, and accordingly it was extremely difficult to come to any concrete decision. Therefore, the Government of the United States, sponsoring nation of the said Washington Conference, recognizing the urgent necessity of concluding some agreement on the limitation of auxiliary ships among the leading Naval Powers without waiting for the conclusion of a disarmament treaty by the League of Nations, made a proposition in February 1927 (Showa 2) to hold a conference among the above five Powers. The Governments of France and Italy, however, did not accept the proposition.

Negotiations were held among the Governments of Japan, Britain, and the U. S. at Geneva in June, the same year, but as there was a wide difference of opinion between Britain and the U. S. concerning cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, the negotiations ended in failure. Then following the changes in the general political situation in these two countries in 1929, (Showa 4), there was a rapid development of the desire to realize disarmament. As a consequence, the British Government, in October of the same year, proposed to the Governments of Japan, U. S., France and Italy to hold a conference in London, with the object of studying the limitations on types of ships not prescribed in the above Washington Treaty, as well as of deliberating the necessary changes to be effected in the stipulations of the said treaty, after carefully studying Article 21, clause 2 thereof in order to adapt the treaty to recent scientific and technical progress. • With the consent of the Governments of the four powers, Japan, Britain, France and Italy, the representatives of the five powers concerned held a conference in London in January 1930 (Showa 5). After about three months' diplomatic negotiations and much meandering, an agreement was finally reached and a treaty called the London Naval Treaty of 1930 was concluded. This was signed and sealed by the plenipotentiaries of the Powers on April 22, the same year. This is the treaty now being referred to the present Council for deliberation.

This treaty consists of 5 parts and 26 articles, together with 3 annexes added to Part II, besides the preamble and the concluding clause. Parts I, II, IV and V are agreements concerning the five Powers, while Part III is an agreement among Japan, Britain and the U. S. Allow me to omit the explanation of its substance here because it is stated in detail in the written report.

On looking back at the progress towards the conclusion of the present treaty, the Imperial Government, at the opening of the London Conference, had decided, according to the established policy of national defense, its three fundamental principles -- (1) To maintain seventy percent of the U.S.'s total tonnage of auxiliary ships; (2) To maintain seventy percent of the U.S.'s total tonnage of heavy cruisers; (3) To maintain the present strength of about 77,800 tons in submarines.

The Government had instructed the plenipotentiaries to carry out this demand and had also announced it to the general public. Nevertheless, the Japanese plenipotentiaries could not attain this object in the negotiations and were

forced to make concessions. They had drafted the so-called temporary compromise plan according to the U. S. proposition, and had asked the Government for instructions. The Government gave instructions that the plan had been generally recognized; and thus was concluded the present treaty outlined on the plan. According to the present treaty, Japan has agreed to maintain only 69.75% of the U.S.'s total tonnage of auxiliary ships, 60.22% of the U.S.'s total tonnage of heavy cruisers, and 52,700 tons of submarines, which will mean a reduction of about 25,100 tons, or about one-third of the present tonnage. Accordingly, the problem of insufficient national defense brought about by the present treaty, as well as the inappropriate measures taken by the government at the time of the instructions, have given rise to much criticism in the country. It was criticised for instance in the recent 58th session of the Imperial Diet and became the subject of much discussion. In view of these circumstances we have made this investigation with special care and have endeavored to study it from various standpoints, and frequently exchanged questions and answers with the Ministers concerned. The following is the outline of the questions and answers.

1. In the past, there were many mistakes in the diplomatic documents referred to the Privy Council. In the present treaty too there were many misprints in the original text, so the Cabinet, after an inquiry, had taken measures to correct them. As it is a matter of great regret that such mistakes should be caused by the carelessness in handling business, we have asked the opinion of the Minister concerned. He has expressed deep regret and has pledged that he would take care not to repeat such mistakes in the future; and he further added that because the omission of the name of the Italian Plenipotentiary was due to the mistake in the original text, it was impossible to correct it and that there was no way but to dispose of this matter by leaving it as it stood.

2. The question of whether or not the instructions of the Government given to our plenipotentiaries in reply to their reference prior to the conclusion of the treaty, were issued with the consent of the Chief of the Naval General Staff-- is a very important constitutional problem, although it may merely seem to be a purely formal point. It was widely played up that the Cabinet had delivered the instructions without going through the formalities and the question gave rise to disputes in the Navy and also gave rise to the "Supreme Command Question" in the recent Imperial Diet. The Navy Minister has obtained the Imperial decision that

the affairs concerning the Naval forces should be dealt with according to the old custom; and that in this case there should have been an accord of opinions between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General Staff. After the Imperial sanction, he reported it to the Prime Minister and notified him that things would be run in this way hereafter. That the Prime Minister had replied that he had received the notification is a point fully clarified by the documents submitted by the Navy Minister. As we thought it very important to clarify the truth of this question, we first asked the Prime Minister, who had at that time been in charge of the business affairs of the Navy Minister, if he had considered it necessary from the beginning to obtain the consent of the Chief of the Navy General Staff in giving the instructions regarding the agreement on naval strength. The Prime Minister answered that he had considered it necessary that there should have been an accord of opinions between them according to the old custom. Next, to the question whether there had actually existed an accord of opinions between them he replied that the Chief of the Naval General Staff asserted at first that our three great principles were the minimum possible demands from the standpoint of our plan of operations; and therefore he, as the one responsible for the manipulation of troops for operations, could not agree to the naval strength outlined upon the U.S. plan which did not fulfil the necessary conditions. However, in the light of the various circumstances thereafter, he had considered that the Chief of the Naval General Staff after all, had no objections to the measures taken by the Government in giving the instructions. As we harboured much suspicion about this answer, we wanted to hear personally from the former Chief of the Naval General Staff, so we had requested the Cabinet to take measures to have him attend the meeting and explain the fact. The Cabinet, however, refused to do it. When we further questioned the reason why, the Ministers of State, in reply to questions in the Diet on this problem, had answered that the Government had decided the matter, after taking the opinions of the military circle into consideration, and intentionally avoided the use of the expression "consent" or "accord of opinion"; the Prime Minister explained that the Cabinet had answered simply "taking into consideration so and so," because it had considered it undesirable to give a detailed account of its relation with the military circle in the Diet.

Moreover, to the question whether Plenipotentiary TAKARABE, who had been the Navy Minister, in signing this treaty did not think the Chief of the Naval General Staff

would oppose the contents of the draft, the Navy Minister answered that, although he had been informed of some dissatisfaction on the part of some of the naval officers at that time, he considered that they would refrain if their opposition involved the risk of a break down in the negotiations. When further questioned why he did not confirm the intention of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the Minister replied that there was a man in charge of business matters of the Navy Minister at that time in the Cabinet and that he had signed the treaty as a plenipotentiary, according to instructions from the Government. He further explained that judging from the telegram received from the Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time of the instructions, he had thought the Chief had rather agreed to the instructions.

3. Regarding the circumstances under which the Government accepted the proposed compromise which was inconsistent with the so-called three great principles held to be the minimum demand for part of our naval strength necessary for national defense, the Government explained that though they would admit the proposal was unsatisfactory, there had been no possibility of reaching any other adequate agreement, judging from the development of the negotiations. If the conference broke down, it would have had a grave influence upon the international situation of Japan; and considering the financial and economic hardships which would be visited upon our country through competition in shipbuilding, etc., in other words looking at the matter from the general situation of our nation, he considered the Government could not help but accept the proposal.

We then put a question to the Minister concerned, whether the security of the national defense of our country could be secured by the naval strength prescribed in the present treaty; and he answered that it might be difficult to carry out operational plans according to the existing principles of national defense with the above naval strength. On one hand, however, Japan has succeeded in maintaining more tonnage of light cruisers and submarines than expected. While on the other hand if she carries out the right to build replacement ships; does her best to perfect quality by completing equipment and improving armaments of existing ships, equipping ships not subject to limitations; increases the number of airplanes; and makes an effort to develop her troops "technical" power by improving training and discipline and increasing the number of crews, he believed that the security of our national defense could practically be expected.

He further said that the term of validity of this treaty is as short as five or six years, and that through Japan's demand, a prescription has been added to Article 23 of this treaty promising Japan a position to discuss in the next conference from an entirely free standpoint without any restrictions from the present treaty. Therefore, he explained, though there are some points with which we are dissatisfied in this treaty, we are left a way to adjust them in the future difficult though it may be.

4. If the U.S. is to maintain 18 heavy cruisers according to the provisions of this treaty, Japan will have her heavy cruisers considerably reduced in ratio to the U.S. two or three years after 1936 and this will bring about insecurity in our national defense. There are some who are of the opinion that the Chinese problem will then give rise to complications between Japan and the U.S. As we felt anxiety on this point, we asked the opinion of the authorities; the Minister concerned replied that, in order to prepare for the period immediately after the expiration of the treaty term, we must make previous preparations within the extent of the provisions of the treaty, and accelerate the building of new ships after the termination of the treaty; thereby we shall be able to increase our ratio. It is hard to believe that the U. S. will take a provocative attitude toward Japan during that time; and he explained that as the diplomatic relations between the two countries will become more amicable by the conclusion of this treaty, there will be no fear of any war.

5. The Government authorities have explained that the deficiency in naval strength caused by this treaty will be replenished as a result of the next conference. However, Japan has already failed once, at the Washington Conference, to realize her demand to maintain 70% in capital ships of the amount of the U.S.; and she has failed the second time at the recent London Conference to realize her demand to maintain 70% in heavy cruisers and her present strength in submarines. Thus, it will not be difficult to imagine that she will face more difficulties in carrying through her demands at the next conference. Especially, the conditional clause of Article 23 of this treaty not only seems to be meaningless in legal logic but according to the original text of Article 23, the object of holding the conference of 1935 lies in the conclusion of a new treaty with the object of a gradual realization of disarmament. Accordingly, such a demand like the above is likely to be regarded as expansion of armament; especially the demand to increase the numerical strength of

submarines will be contrary to the spirit of the article, and it was feared that it would be impossible to carry through such a demand. When we questioned the Minister in charge on this point, he replied that it does not necessarily mean that Japan should contend her three great principles at the next conference. He further asserted that only by taking into consideration the various changes in the situation during the next few years shall we establish the best policy and strive to carry through its demands; and that even if we should repeat the demands of the three great principles, the total tonnage of auxiliary ships and the cost of construction shall not exceed the limitations prescribed in this treaty, so it cannot necessarily be regarded as an expansion of armaments.

6. It has been acknowledged by the Government itself that the naval strength prescribed in this treaty is insufficient and that, unless some appropriate replacement programme be established, we can never hope for security in our national defense. If so, what will be the result of such a replacement program? What will be the expenditure necessary for it? What will be the surplus fund to be produced by this treaty and will it or will it not lighten the burden of taxes on our people; and if so, to what extent?

As all these questions are very essential for judging whether this treaty will attain its object or not, and are the important items for investigation, we demanded that the Government give us a general outline on these points. To this, the Minister in charge explained that a national defense replacement programme is now under investigation by the Naval General Staff, but as it will not be published till the investigation is complete and approved by the Navy Ministry and further discussed with the other Government departments concerned, the time for decision will be, at the earliest, this autumn, about the time when the national budget will be drawn up. However, as there will be considerable surplus funds following the fulfilment of this treaty, the Government will declare on its own responsibility that part of it will be appropriated for the replacement of deficiencies in our national defense, while the rest will be appropriated to lighten the burden of taxes on the people.

^{hundred million}
Supposing we consider it on the basis of the total sum of five ~~billion~~ ^{hundred million} yen reserved in the financial programme for 1930 (Showa 5) to 1936 (Showa 11) as an established plan for the Navy, there will still be some surplus fund even if Japan makes use of every right to build the replacement ships prescribed in this treaty. He explained

therefore, that this will be appropriated to the cost of replacements in our national defense and also to the reduction of taxes.

Such, then, was the gist of the questions and answers. In short, the object of this treaty lies in revising and supplementing the Washington Treaty, and concluding an agreement on various limitations in every type of ships for the realization of disarmament. Now, security or insecurity of national defense decides the fate of a country. Accordingly, to conclude an agreement limiting the armament of a country is a matter which requires the most serious consideration.

There is good reason in regard to the military affairs of our country where the military administration has been separated from the military command for years, and each, with its own separate organs, has been cooperating in assisting the exercise of the Imperial authority. However, it is of great regret that there had been in the Navy some controversies, which afterwards gave rise to criticism in the general public, about the measures taken by the Cabinet in deciding their instructions at the time of the signing of this treaty. The Cabinet not only answered that they had thought there were no objections from the Chief of the Naval General Staff at the time the instructions were decided; but also that the Navy Minister had obtained the Imperial decision that matters pertaining to naval strength should require an accord of opinions between the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Naval General Staff, and that the decision had been reported to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister has been instructed to stick to the rule in the future, and as there has been a reply of acceptance from him, there is no necessity of discussing the "Supreme Command problem."

This affords us much gratification. Moreover, in looking at the object of this treaty, of course everyone should be willing to give his approval to its spirit of promoting world peace and preventing the danger of competitive armament, and reducing the public's burden. But the question is, as far as Japan is concerned, whether or not she will be able to attain the object with the naval strength prescribed in this treaty without bringing about any deficiency in her national defense. As this is the most important point of argument in judging the results of this treaty, we have made a careful and thorough investigation on this point. The Ministers concerned, however, have admitted that there are deficiencies in the

naval strength prescribed in this treaty, but asserted that the security of national defense could in fact be expected by taking replacement measures. As for the replacement plan, they did not even show us its general outline, nor its principal items, on the ground that they have not yet completed the investigation, and they also have not explained much about the necessary expenditures and the estimates in the reduction of taxes. All that the Government has done was to declare on its own responsibility, that the deficiencies in our national defense will be replenished and that a considerable reduction of taxes will be carried out. But as the national defense replenishment programme essentially, should be drawn up by the mutual agreement of the Minister of State and the organs of the military command, and is not to be declared on the responsibility of the State Minister alone, we thought that the opinion of the organs having direct access to the throne would be greatly instrumental in our judgment of the problem, and we were anxious to hear their opinions by some means or other. Finally, we requested the State Minister to take steps to submit the written document of the Military Council in reply to the Imperial question, but the request was rejected by the State Minister. Originally, according to explanations by the Foreign Minister, this treaty had already been ratified by the U. S. Britain will not complete her ratification as far as Ireland is concerned until November, this year. So, even if Japan should ratify it today it would not come into effect immediately. Accordingly, in view of the grave influence that will be exercised on the interests of Japan by the results of the conclusion of this treaty, we thought it better to spend some time in waiting for the completion of the Government's investigation on the aforesaid national defense replenishment programme, and then to make mature deliberations on the question. We proposed our opinion to the State Minister but he did not approve the idea.

It was a matter of great regret for us, for it has been our duty to consider problems carefully and deliberately. But, according to the explanations of the State Ministers, the internal situation lately has become very deplorable, and they stressed that if the ratification of this treaty is left long undecided, it will give rise to political and economical unrest and exert a bad influence upon the general public. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that, under such circumstances, there was no other way than to adopt a vote on the problem, by limiting our investigations to the extent mentioned above,

and relying upon the responsibility of the authorities concerned. As there seems to be no fear of any other obstacle in the provisions of this treaty, we think it is inevitable, under these circumstances, to give our final decision and recognize this treaty. Relying upon the responsibility of the State Ministers who have pledged that they would take every measure to attain the object of the treaty by carrying out the national defense replenishment programme in concert with military circles and by reducing the burden of taxes, the Investigation Committee has unanimously passed a resolution.

I respectfully report the result of the investigation to the Throne that the Privy Council should pass the draft treaty.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): I should now like to state briefly the opinion of the Government on today's problem of ratification of the London Naval Treaty. The object of the London Naval Treaty, as has just been reported by the Chief of the Investigation Committee, is to prevent the danger of competitive armament for the sake of world peace, and to reduce the burden of taxes; and this treaty has been signed and sealed by the representatives of the Five Powers--Japan, Britain, the U.S., France and Italy. As far as Japan, Britain and the U. S. are concerned, we have been successful in an agreement on the limitation of auxiliary ships which had not been realized at the Washington and Geneva Conferences, and have been able to put a limitation on every type of ship.

Generally speaking, the agreement on the limitation in maintaining strength of auxiliary ships contains more complicated questions than the agreement on capital ships; and at the recent London Conference there has been much meandering in its discussions for which reason France and Italy, finally, refused to join the treaty. Japan, Britain and the U. S., however, judging from the general situation, have concluded the treaty with a spirit of mutual concession and compromise. Therefore, the result of the agreement in the said treaty on maintaining strength in auxiliary ships does not fully satisfy our demands, which will mean that deficiencies will arise in our Naval strength for maintaining and executing the present plan of operations, drawn up according to our established policy of national defense. But the military specialists are agreed in their opinion that such deficiencies can be remedied by taking some other proper replenishment measures, and that any difficulties in our

national defense can be prevented. This replenishment programme is presently under careful investigation by the Government and we are not yet able to give you the actual figures. In short, its object is to replenish the quality and to promote technical power. The outline of its principal items is, as has been explained by the Navy Minister at the Investigation Committee. As the fund for the established Naval programme reserved in the financial programme for 1931 (Showa 6) to 1936 (Showa 11) amounts to a total of about half a billion yen, this will be properly appropriated for the expenditure in building replacement ships and for replenishing deficiencies in our naval strength mentioned before and also for reducing taxes. As you all know, the U. S. has already ratified this treaty. As for the British Empire, almost all of the British Commonwealth of Nations have either ratified it or have finished preparations to ratify it, except for Ireland, whose procedure for ratification will be taken either after the opening of her ordinary Diet session in November this year, unless some other means for ratification may be devised before that.

We have not yet received any definite report on it, but, after all, we cannot imagine that difficulties will arise in its ratification. There are some points in the State Minister's reply, given in the reports of the Investigation Committee, which seem to prove that the meaning of our explanation has not been thoroughly understood. But as it is feared that this matter will involve too many complications, I shall not indicate them here. In short, the Government, at this occasion, hopes, in view of the internal and external situations, that the draft treaty will be passed promptly.

No. 36 (ISHII): I received on August 15, the documents relating to the London Treaty, which is presently being referred to the Privy Council. I think the President had appointed the members of the Investigation Committee prior to this, and the said documents were distributed to me at the same time with the members of the Committee. This, originally, is a matter of course, but the previous method was not necessarily like this. So I had once expressed my opinion that, as it is all the Councillors who have been ordered to discuss, it is a duty that every member should have access to the documents as soon as they are called upon for discussion,--that is to say, that I wish the documents to be distributed as soon as possible. I hereby wish to express my gratification, for I believe the recent method of distributing documents, from this standpoint, is an improvement in the proceedings of the Privy Council. I have

one thing I wish to ask the President, though it may seem presumptuous. Three weeks time had elapsed since the Privy Council had been called upon to discuss this matter on July 24 before I had received the documents on August 15. What was the Privy Council doing when such an important problem had been brought up? There had been frequent voices of distrust in the public and I, too, was one that felt suspicion about it. During that time, according to newspapers and other sources, the President had requested the Prime Minister to submit the answers of the Supreme War Council in reply to the Imperial question on about August 5, ten days after the draft treaty had been referred to the Privy Council, and the Prime Minister declined it.

One week after that, the Investigation Committee was organized. Thus, we Councillors could know nothing about the substance of the bill for three weeks though we had been consulted by the Emperor. I believe that when such an important bill is submitted to the Privy Council, the authorities should distribute the bill immediately and hold the Investigation Committee as soon as possible, and if there is something to ask the authorities it should be done after the Councillors are consulted over the matter. I don't intend to denounce the President for his behaviour in the past. I only wish to call his attention to this point, in order to promote the authority of the Privy Council which is the supreme advisory organ for the Emperor. If the President has any explanations to make on this point, I would like to hear it.

President (KURATOMI): No. 36 has just expressed his desire about the distribution of documents. But, it is needless for me to say that Article 7 of the Business Affairs Regulations of the Privy Council prescribes that the report of the Investigation Committee should be distributed, together with annexed documents, to all Councillors at least three days before the opening of the conference. In the past, according to this regulation, we had distributed the documents three days before the conference after the report of the Investigation Committee had been submitted. I do not think, however, that this provision is absolute. Accordingly, I do not think it against the regulations to distribute, if necessary for convenience' sake, before the Investigation has been completed. There had been examples when documents had been distributed beforehand in cases when the bill required a large quantity of documents. It is so with the present case. But this cannot be arranged according to the convenience of the Privy Council alone.

The relation with the Government must also be taken into consideration. So, in the present case, I have adopted an irregular measure after having consulted the Government. It does not necessarily mean that such a measure will always be taken hereafter. Moreover, No. 36 has talked as if I had delayed the investigation in order to have the written reply of the Supreme War Council submitted to the Privy Council, but it is not true. I did not demand the presentation of the document, I only advised its presentation, and I did not delay the investigation. As has been reported by the Chief of the Investigation Committee, there are liable to be some mistakes in the documents of the bill. In the present case too, the Government had to take due formalities for corrections, and more than ten days had elapsed during that time. These are necessary procedures for investigation. As I have stated above, it is a usual practice to distribute documents after the investigation is over, so the opinion of No. 36 is unreasonable.

No. 36 (ISHII): I, too, have knowledge of the provision of the Business Affairs Regulations of the Privy Council concerning distribution of documents. But according to the provision, it is stated "together with the reports" and not "at the same time as the reports." Moreover, looking at it from the point of common sense, there is no reason why documents should not be distributed beforehand. And as the President has expedited the time of distribution in this case, I only wish that this precedent could be followed in the future. I did not say anything about the past. I only said about the future. According to explanations just made by the President, even in the future, whenever some important problem is referred to the Privy Council, several weeks will be needed for the careful investigation of documents. I cannot help feeling anxiety about the future. I hope that, if any problem is referred to the Privy Council, a committee will be organized immediately and will be ordered to investigate the matter. Then the Councillors can investigate the matter together with the Government authorities and can revise the points which require revision. It is an excessively cautious and therefore unsuitable system, not to distribute documents until the Chief Secretary and his assistants spend some days in investigating the bill and correcting the misprints. But I shall not discuss the matter further. I only wish to express my regret here that my opinion was not thoroughly understood, although I had meant it for the future of the Privy Council.

I shall now wish to put my questions to the Government. First, as regards the three great principles; judging from the expression in the report, "the Imperial Government has decided the three great principles... based on the established policy of national defense," it seems to me that the three great principles had been decided just before the London Conference. So I think the principles had, of course, also been included in the instructions given to our plenipotentiaries. Now, the Navy Minister and other Naval authorities seem to have greatly emphasized the three great principles prior to the conference, stressing that this was the minimum demand for our national defense, and had informed people that in case these principles should not be realized, it would endanger our national defense. Naturally, the general public, lacking correct knowledge, would readily believe it, would be very anxious about it if even the slightest part of these principles is not realized, and believe that it would surely bring about defeat in war. I, myself, was one of those who felt such anxiety, although I have been relieved of it, because it has been pointed out in the reports that these principles should not necessarily be followed in the next conference.

I think that these circumstances should be made clear to the public, as it is because of these three principles that the people are afraid of the U. S. Now, it seems these three principles did not exist at the time of the previous Geneva Conference. Allow me to refer briefly to what the Japanese plenipotentiaries proposed to the plenipotentiaries of Britain and the U. S. at that conference. There were no such principles in the instructions given to the Japanese representatives at that time. But at the Conference, the U. S. wanted an equal balance of power with Britain, while Britain asserted that she would need 620,000 tons of auxiliary ships for she required many cruisers on account of her special position, and tried to reduce the maintenance of Japan's force. As the negotiations became complicated, Japan was compelled to propose that if Britain and the U. S. would reduce the tonnage of auxiliary ships to 470,000 tons, Japan was ready to reduce hers to 310,000 tons. To this, the U. S. agreed on principle, while Britain did not. So Vice-Admiral KODAMASHI studied the matter with FIELD, a U. S. delegate, and made a compromise plan, but it was not agreed on at the conference. As regards submarines, it was decided that Japan, Britain and the U. S. should maintain 60,000 tons respectively. Thus, does not the result of the recent London Conference resemble Japan's proposition at the above Geneva Conference? It is regrettable that there are many among the people who are discontented with this treaty, by which, according to their belief, an unreasonable naval ratio had been forced upon Japan by Britain and the U. S. The naval authorities should have made it known to the public that there had been no oppression by Britain and the U. S. concerning the conclusion of the recent agreement.

Secondly, when did the so-called three great principles come into existence? It seems they did not exist in about 1927 /Showa 2/. Actually, did not our naval authorities consent at the Geneva Conference to our maintaining 60,000 tons of submarines? I do not think that the international situation has become worse during the three years after that. On the

contrary, the Anti-War Pact had been concluded, and it may be said to have advanced the countries a step forward in their peaceful relations. Nevertheless, at the last conference our authorities had demanded that Japan should maintain 70,000 tons of submarines, an increase of 10,000 tons to the former 60,000 tons. I just cannot understand the reason, and I entertain suspicions about the three great principles.

Moreover, as for the national defense replacement program, there was talk as if there was some proper method of replacement, both in the reports of the Investigation Committee as well as in the explanation of the Premier. But what is the meaning of the word "proper"? As Japan had insisted on maintaining 60,000 tons of submarines in 1927 /Showa 2/, and has been compelled to consent to 52,000 tons at the recent conference, the difference of 7,000 or 8,000 tons can (not?) logically be called a deficiency in our national defense. Though the U. S. formally insisted on the five-five-three ratio in submarines, she has recently consented to an equal basis. From this standpoint, we must admit that she, too, has made concessions. As for other auxiliary ships, the recent proposition made by Britain and the U. S. closely resembles the one made by Japan in former years.

Accordingly, I am of the opinion that 73,000,000 yen is sufficient for the expenditure in our national defense replacement program, and that it would not only be proper to appropriate the remainder of the half billion yen minus the said sum of 73,000,000 yen to the reduction of taxes, but it would also conform to the previous demand of our Navy. In short, I wish to have the Navy Minister explain when the three great principles came into existence, and had become an irreducible, established policy for our national defense. I also wish to hear the Navy's explanations on the national defense replacement program. I don't want to hear about the concrete plan; the principle alone will be enough.

Except for the above questions and requests, the present treaty is not one which Japan was forced to accept. I agree to this treaty because the recent propositions by Britain and the U. S. are in line with the propositions made by our country three years ago, and it is our duty to accept it. Moreover, I wish to express my whole-hearted approval of the conclusion that this bill shall be passed with faith in the responsible utterances of the State Ministers, as has been stated at the end of the report by the Chief of the Investigation Committee.

No. 5 (TAKARAME): The first point of your question seems to be, when did the so-called three great principles come into existence, which did not exist in 1927 /Showa 2/, at the time of the Geneva Conference. Of course, there was no such thing as the three great principles at the time of the Geneva Conference. To be precise, even at the last conference, they have neither been clearly implied in the instructions given to the plenipotentiaries nor have they been formally declared. Why, then, have there been rumors about them?

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In the first place, we had considered it necessary for our Navy to have 70 per cent in strength of the most probable potential enemy, and we had made efforts to maintain this ratio in capital ships at the Washington Conference. But, finally, we had failed to attain this object and the ratio was fixed at 60 per cent. Thus, the five-five-three ratio was decided on the condition that the status quo shall be maintained in defense in the Western Pacific. At the Geneva Conference, too, we had contemplated, in general, the maintenance of 70 per cent in auxiliary ships, but the 70 per cent decided was a general estimate and did not go into details regarding the tonnages per types of ships. Speaking of submarines, Japan's demand was 70,000 tons, which is equivalent to the present 73,000 tons. This is because submarines under 300 tons were not subject to any limitations at the time of the Geneva Conference, and so they were not put into calculation. In short, it was a demand to maintain Japan's present strength.

Then there was a question whether there had been no objections in Central Naval Headquarters to the 60,000 tons equal basis decided in their provisional compromise draft by the experts commission of Japan and Great Britain. Yes, there had been many objections. Although, at that time we had acquired the right to maintain more than 70 per cent in cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, it did not reach the 70 per cent mark in total tonnage, so there had been much criticism and argument. Therefore, at the opening of the present London Conference, it was again our Navy's stand to maintain the present strength. Of course, at the time of the Geneva Conference all the powers did not attach so much importance to cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, as today. For this reason, the strength maintained by Japan was even considered comparatively favorable. But today, as a far superior fighting power has been recognized in newly-built cruisers, Japan, too, has demanded 70 per cent. This, however, is not a new and hastily decided policy.

The so-called three great principles are concerned with the military strength necessary for the execution of the plan of operations based on the national defense policy decided in 1923 /Taisho 12/. Thus, the three points - 70 per cent in total, 70 per cent in cruisers with 8-inch guns, and the present strength in submarines - were instructed. No mention was made as to which of the three would be the more important, and the expression "the three great principles" was not used in any of the official documents. Just because these three were the main points in our demands, people called them the three great principles. The Navy has always attached importance to them.

As has been explained by Councillor ISHII, we had failed to accomplish our demand of 70 per cent in capital ships at the Washington Conference, and it was decided at 60 per cent; and also at the Geneva Conference our strength in auxiliary ships was set at 60 per cent in the provisional compromise draft between Japan and Britain. Accordingly, our Naval authorities, after years and years of investigations, were well aware of the difficulties in carrying through our demand of 70 per cent. In view of these former experiences, they had instructed our plenipotentiaries with the three

great principles, for the first time, just before the opening of the last Conference. Prepared to fight with their backs against the wall, they put every effort into obtaining the understanding of the whole nation. For this purpose, young officers made trips to various places and gave lectures, greatly emphasizing the importance of the three great principles. Some of them seem to have pushed their arguments to extremes by stressing that it would mean the ruin of our nation if we should fail to accomplish these principles. These were all manifestations of their patriotic spirit, and as a result, the public opinion was thoroughly unified. I believe this has had much to do with our success at the Conference in obtaining the ratio of 70 per cent in total tonnage.

Though Councillor ISHII seems to be greatly discontented that the military circle has previously much emphasized the three great principles and is showing no effort whatever today in further obtaining the understandings of the people concerning the consequence of this conference, there is a natural limit to the necessity of things. There is a difference between the situations prior to the opening of the conference and that of today. More so, when we think of the next conference. We should make a more thorough investigation on points that will become necessary at the next conference, and strive for the best measures. Generally, the fact that one has a position at one moment, does not necessarily mean that it is one's position forever. For instance, the U. S. at one time, advocated the necessity of submarines, and at another time, she advocated the complete discontinuance of the use of submarines. There can be a great change between the armaments of ten years ago and those of today. So it is only natural that a nation's demands should change according to the circumstances. As to the expenditures for replacement and the tax problem, I believe the Prime Minister will give you the reply.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As to the problems of the national defense replacement plan and the reduction of taxes, the opinion of the Government expressed at the Committee Meeting has been stated minutely in the reports of the Investigation Committee, the conclusion being especially well written, so it will be unnecessary for me to make further explanations at this moment. Moreover, I believe Councillor ISHII will not insist upon my explanation. In short, both the problem of replacement plan and the problem of reduction of taxes are still under intensive investigation by the authorities concerned, and at present we are unable to give you any concrete figures. The gist of the replacement plan is as has been stated by the Navy Minister at the Committee Meeting and which has been quoted in the report. Anything beyond that is uncertain at present and cannot be decided until the budget will have been framed this autumn. As I do not wish to say anything of which I am not sure, I shall refrain from making any further explanation beyond this point at present.

No. 36 (ISHII): I neither wish to ask the Government for any concrete plan nor for any explanation about figures. According to the report, it is stated that the Government would not publish even the general principles of the

replacement plan and the reduction of taxes, but the Premier has just talked as if the Government had given a detailed explanation. Insofar as the Privy Council has been called upon to deliberate on this bill, I feel, as a member of the Committee, that it is proper for me to put some questions to the Government about the replacement plan and the reduction of taxes which are the immediate purposes of this treaty. When it comes to not informing the councillors of even the general outline of the treaty, it is making it too difficult for them to pass any judgment. Merely as a principle, can't we have the general estimation as to what amount, in general, will be appropriated to the expenditure in replacements and what amount to the reduction of taxes; or, on the basis of 7,500 tons deficiency in submarines, what amount will be necessary for replacement? I would like to have as much explanation as you can give on this point.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As I have just stated the opinion of the Government, the total sum that will be reserved from 1931 /Showa 6/ to 1936 /Showa 11/ for the Navy's established program will be about half a billion yen, and this will be appropriated to the expenditures for building replacement ships and replenishing our naval strength according to this treaty, and to the reduction of taxes. But as these are mutually related they must be decided at the same time, and, so, they cannot be clarified until the time when the budget will be framed. Now, not speaking of the amount of money, what is the general outline?

On this point, it has been stated in the explanation of the Navy Minister at the Investigation Committee, written in page 23 of the Investigation report, as follows: "Then, can we or can we not expect the security of our national defense with the naval strength prescribed in this treaty? We have queried this point with the Minister concerned. To this, the Minister replied that this naval strength would perhaps be insufficient to maintain and fulfill the plan of operations based on the existing plan of national defense. But, on one hand, we have been successful in securing the right to maintain more light cruisers and destroyers than we had expected; and if, on the other hand, we take steps for replenishment by properly executing the right to build replacement ships, and moreover, strive to perfect the quality of the Navy by completely equipping the existing ships, renovating their armaments, equipping the ships not under limitation, expanding the air force, etc., and do our best to improve technical strength by renovating the training and education of navy personnel, and increasing the number of crews, I believe we can pretty well rely on the security of our national defense."

This is the explanation of the general outline given at the Investigation Committee. I regret to say that this is all the material I have today, to make any more explanations, and I hope you will forgive me.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): Do you intend to continue this conference in the afternoon?

President (KURATAMI): If the discussion is unfinished we may continue in the afternoon, after we ask the convenience of the Emperor.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): Regarding this treaty, it has been reported after full and impartial consideration by each committee member, so it has been pretty well understood, but there are many matters I wish to question more particularly. However, judging from the replies made by the Government, it seems to me that the Government does not wish to make any answer further than its explanations at the Committee Meeting. So I shall rely on the Committee report and refrain from putting any further questions. But, in the report it says: "According to explanations by the State Minister, the internal situation has become deplorably bad these days...etc." What is the meaning of this? I would like to have a full explanation.

No. 4 (HAMAGUCHI): As regards the London Treaty, there had been, prior to its being referred to the Privy Council for deliberation, various rumors in public about the influence it will have upon the political world, and some mischievous elements, in line with these rumors, had been spreading a number of wild tales. For this reason, there were indications that unrest had been arising in the political and financial worlds. The treaty was referred to the Privy Council for deliberation on July 24, and after preliminary investigations by the Secretariat of the Council, it was brought before the Investigation Committee which convened for the first time on August 16. Since then more than fifty days had passed till September 17, and the meeting of the Committee had been held twelve times during that period. Meanwhile, the newspapers in Tokyo, not being informed of the proceedings of the Investigation Committee which had been kept secret, indulged in conjectures and published a number of articles. Readers, ignorant of the circumstances, would either harbor suspicions about the destiny of the treaty, or would be sceptical about a probable discord between the Privy Council and the Government. Various organizations, taking advantage of this situation, began one after the other to attempt mischief-making; and among the various articles, there were some that could be classified as reprehensible. They were openly or secretly distributed to various quarters, and every means of alienation and slander were attempted. This being the situation, it was impossible for people to discriminate truth from falsehood and good from bad. As a result, it is a fact that cannot be concealed, that the general public was driven to an indescribable sort of unrest and unhappiness. Even if it were not so, public feeling today is apt to lack stability and self-possession, and it is deplorable that such a condition should long continue.

As long as the destiny of this treaty remains undecided, it will not only be impossible to eradicate this type of unrest, but it is evident that there will be a tendency for the unrest in public feeling to gradually increase, incited by daily articles in newspapers and all the other scandalous propaganda. The problem of the financial world in particular, is what the Government cannot help but be mostly concerned about.

The present financial situation is being affected by the great world depression as well as by the remedial measures taken after the lifting of the embargo on gold; and this is a most important period, when we shall have to act with caution. Without the utmost effort on the part of the Government and people, united in one fixed policy, I fear the future of our national economy will be greatly endangered.

At this moment of long political unrest resulting from the untoward relations between the Government and the Privy Council, our economic circles have become very nervous from fear that there might be a drastic change any time in our financial and economic policies due to a possible political upheaval; business and financial circles have been unable to manage their business and keep themselves peacefully employed in their work. They could not look on at the course of events with folded arms; but, alarming rumors were meanwhile current, throwing financial circles into confusion and disturbing the public bonds and all the other valuable securities markets, and they were far from being stable.

In the first place, such things as political unrest and speculations on political changes, are not supposed to have so much influence upon the financial circles in ordinary times; but, in this case, it is not very long since the embargo on gold was lifted and its influence has not yet subsided. Moreover, as I have previously related, when the influence of world depression had become considerably grave, and public sentiment had become very nervous, the theory of lifting the gold embargo at par, which had hitherto been advocated rather as an academic curiosity, had become very popular among some of the scholars and editors of newspapers and magazines. For this reason, not only those connected with the stock-markets began utilizing this theory speculatively, but some people holding pretty high positions in the political and financial worlds, especially those with very pessimistic opinions on the present and future situation of our financial circles, whether with intention to deceive or in good faith, had been making observations in some quarters of financial circles that the next Cabinet may make it their policy to prohibit the export of gold again; and when, as a consequence, the exchange rate falls to a certain degree and is stabilized, devaluation will be executed according to it, and then the embargo on the export of gold will be lifted once again. Many began to believe in it; and many, though they did not wholly believe in it, tried to take advantage of such fears in the financial circles for their selfish designs. Such a phenomenon is beyond the imagination of an intelligent man; but as financial circles are presently in a specially nervous condition, this propaganda and supposition, which is partly true and partly false, has in fact exerted considerable influence. Its most outstanding fact lies in the outflow of specie to foreign countries. The considerable outflow of specie during the import period in the first half of the year under the lifting of the gold embargo is not a matter to be suspicious about. But, that there has been a very great amount of outflow in specie at a period of favorable balance of trade in the second half of the year, especially recently, at the end of the year when it is still far from the period for imports, is, I believe, attributable to the instability in the exchange-rate in anticipation of the lifting of embargo on the new par, which will result from the prohibition of gold export, granting the political unrest resulting from the various speculations caused by the delay in the progress of deliberations of this treaty at the Privy Council by political and financial circles; though there may be other reasons for it.

Therefore, if the deliberations of the Privy Council are to be further prolonged in getting to a decision, and if the political unrest is not

eliminated, the tendency mentioned above will become doubly pronounced, and as a result, there is no telling what lamentable phenomenon we shall see in general financial circles.

This, really, is the point the Government had been mostly concerned about in the course of deliberating this treaty. Fortunately, since every member of the Investigation Committee, with the State their first consideration, has promptly concluded their deliberations and approved this bill unanimously, we have finally been able to see stability in political circles since the middle of September. The Government is deeply gratified that we have been able to eliminate the financial unrest which has resulted from these political anxieties.

No. 23 (ISHIGURO): I understand. Although there are many questions I wish to ask, a strict investigation has been made by all the members of the Investigation Committee, so I shall respect it and believe in it. I, hereby, wish to express my approval.

President (KURATONI): As there is no other proposal, we shall take a vote on the bill. All in favor of the investigation report, please stand up.

(Approved unanimously)

The Emperor retires.

(Meeting adjourned at 12:20 P.M.)

Signed by:

President:	Baron Yuzaburo KURATONI
Chief Secretary:	Hyoji FUTAKAMI
Secretaries:	Sueo HORIE Morio MUTO

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Secretaries:	Sueo HORIE Morio MUTO

C E R T I F I C A T E

I.P.S. No. 891-A

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, /s/ T. Suzuki hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Secretary of Privy Council

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 106 pages, dated 1 October, 1930, and described as follows: Book entitled "A Record of the Privy Council Concerning the Ratification of the London Naval Treaty of 1930," dated 1st October, 1930.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Privy Council Secretariat

Signed at Tokyo on this
1 day of Oct., 1946.

Witness: J. A. Curtis 2d Lt.

/s/ T. Suzuki
Signature of Official
SEAL
Secretary of Privy Council
Official Capacity

Procurement

No. 6x914

~~Not Used~~ Doc 89

千九百三十二年「ロンド」海軍條約御批准
ノ件 會議筆記

昭和五年十月一日

正

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No. 2

樞密院會議筆記

一千九百三十年十月一日 海軍
條約御批在件

昭和五年十月一日(水曜日)午前十時三十分
開議

聖上臨御

出席員

倉富議長
平沼副議長

大臣

- 濱口内閣總理大臣 四番
- 陸軍部海軍大臣 五番
- 幣原外務大臣 六番
- 江木鐵道大臣 七番
- 上田司法大臣 八番
- 井上藏大臣 九番
- 依田商工大臣 十番
- 安達内務大臣 十一番
- 松田農林大臣 十二番
- 田中拓務大臣 十三番
- 田中文部大臣 十四番
- 阿部陸軍大臣臨時代理 十五番

顧問官

伊東 顧問官 十六番

Doc 891

No. 3

關 帝 員
皇 族

大臣	戴宣雍	仁親王	三番
	載仁親王	親王	二番
	山泉流信大臣		十四番

金子	顧問官	二十番
久保田	顧問官	廿一番
富井	顧問官	廿二番
石黒	顧問官	廿三番
黒川	顧問官	廿四番
古市	顧問官	廿五番
江松	顧問官	廿六番
井木	顧問官	廿七番
櫻井	顧問官	廿八番
田井	顧問官	廿九番
荒井	顧問官	三十番
河合	顧問官	廿一番
鎌田	顧問官	廿二番
鈴木	顧問官	廿三番
石井	顧問官	廿四番
水田	顧問官	廿五番
福田	顧問官	廿六番
	顧問官	廿七番
	顧問官	廿八番
	顧問官	廿九番

Doc 891

No. 4

顧問官

石原 九鬼 顧問官 十九番
顧問官 廿三番

委員

川崎 法制局長官
金森 法制局長官
吉田 外務次官
松永 外務省條約局長
齋藤 外務省情報部長
山形 外務書記官
山内 外務書記官
山本 外務書記官
堀田 海軍軍務局長
下村 海軍軍務局長
岩本 海軍軍務局長
佐佐 海軍軍務局長
佐佐 海軍軍務局長

書記官

伊東 審査委員長
書記官長
書記官長

Dac 891

No. 5

書記官

武藤 江 藤 書記官

議長(倉憲)之ヨリ會議ヲ開ク豫メ御通知スル通リ

千九百三十年、ロンドン海軍條約御批准、件

ヲ議題ニ供ス本案、先例ニ依リ讀會ヲ省略シテ大體議止、朗讀ヲ省略シテ審査委員長、報告ヲ求ム

報告員(伊東) 今同御諮詢、千九百三十年、ロンドン海軍條約御批准、件、關之本官等審査委員フル、命ヲ受ルヤ事能、關要甚、重大ニテ深ク考慮ヲ盡スモ、トルヲ念ヒ去ル八月十八日以來屢次會同國務大臣、辯明ヲ聽キ、各員夫、所見ヲ述テ、及復審議ヲ重ニ荷モ之ヲ查覈ニ遺闕ナカシムコトヲ期スリ

先之條約、由來ニ付テ述ヘ、大正十二年二月米國華盛頓、會議於、日英米佛伊、五國間、成立スル海軍軍備制限、關スル條約、主力艦及航空母艦ニ付、其、各國、保有量、軍艦噸數及備砲ニ關スル制限ヲ協定スルモ補助艦ニ付、其、軍艦噸數及搭載砲口徑、制限ヲ約束タルニ止リ、其、各國、保有量ニ關シテ、何等協定スル所ナリニ因リ、同會議後數年トスニ早クモ主要、海軍國間補助艦、建造競走漸ク著カントスル、傾向ヲ見ルニ至リ、此、時ニ方、國際聯盟、其、使命、從ヒ陸海空、全般ニテ、軍備、縮グヲ實現スル、爲頻ニ努メ、所ナリ、モ其、討議、範圍頗ル廣汎ニテ、各國意見、懸隔甚ニ具體的結果、到達スルコト極ク困難ナリ、由リ、前陳華盛頓會議、主催者タル米國政府、國際聯盟ニ於ケル軍備縮グ條約、成

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No. 6

立待ス主と海軍國間ニ補助艦關スル制限ヲ協定スル、急務ナルヲ
認メ昭和二年二月前述ノ國間會議ヲ開催セシト提唱シタルニ佛伊
兩國政府之ヲ受諾セタガ爲同年六月瑞西國、シネ、フ、ニ於テ日英米
三國政府間ニ商議ヲ開始シテ八月迄ニ搭載スル巡洋艦ニ關シ英
米兩國主張甚キ徑庭アリ爲此會議、遂ニ不調ニ終リ然レ昭和
四年至リ右兩國ニ於テ一般政情變化ニ伴ヒ軍備縮少ヲ實現セル、
氣運急速ニ進展シ其結果同年十月英國政府、日米佛伊、各國
政府對シテ前陳華盛頓條約規定ニシテ艦種ニ關スル制限ヲ考
究シ併ニ同條約第二十二條第二項規定ヲ按テ技術上及科學上、
最近、發達ニ適應スル爲同條約、條項ニ加ヘキ變更ヲ審議セル、
目的ヲ以テ英國倫敦ニ會議ヲ開催セシト提議シタリ日英、佛伊
兩國政府、之ヲ之ニ賛同シ昭和五年一月ニ關係國代表者同地ニ會合
約三月ニ至リテ樽俎折衝ヲ重ネ迂餘曲折ヲ盡シ稍々協議調ヒテ九月
二十年、ロンドン、海軍條約ト稱スル條約ヲ協定シ同年四月二十日各國
全權委員ニ於テ之ヲ署名調印シタリ是レ即チ本案ノ條約ナリ
本條約前文及末文、外五編ニ六條及第二編添附セル三附屬書、
成、第一編、第二編、第三編、第四編、及第五編、五國間、協定ニテ第三編曰、
英米三國、協定ナリ其内容、報告書詳述シタルヲ以テ爰ニ説明、
省略ス本條約成立、經過ヲ顧ミ倫敦會議開催、臨ミ帝國政
府既定國防方針、基キ、(一)補助艦總括噸數、對米比率七割
(二)巡洋艦噸數、對米比率七割(三)潜水艦、我々現有量七萬七
千八百餘噸ヲ保有スルニテ三原則ヲ定メ之ヲ主張シ貫徹スルニ
以テ全權委員ニ訓令シ普ニ國內ニ聲明セル所ナリ然レ帝國全
權委員、右會議ニ於テ打衝甚シヤリテ終ニ譲歩ヲ餘儀ナシ
シ結果稍々米國提案ニ基キ所謂假令協定ヲ作成シテ以テ政
府請訓ニ政府カ大體於テ之ヲ承認スル回訓ヲ爲シ、因リ茲ニ該

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No. 7

案ヲ骨子トスル本條約成立ヲ見ルニ至リタルモノニ即チ本條約ニ依リ
帝國補助艦總括保有量ニ於テ對米六割凡令七厘五毛大巡洋艦
保有量ニ於テ同六割三厘三毛ヲ協定シ潜水艦ニ於テ現在約三分
一二萬二千五百餘噸減タル五萬二千七百噸ヲ保有セトスルニ過キス
是ニ於テ本條約伴フ國防缺陷問題同訓當時於ケル政府措置
等關シ朝野間ニ發テ論議ヲ醸現ニ最近ノ第五八回帝國議
會ニ於テモ問題トシ頗ル喧囂ヲ極メタリ此等ノ経緯ニ顧ミ本官等
ハ特ニ慎重ナル態度ヲ以テ本案ヲ審査シ從事ニ種々點檢シ攷究スル
ト好シ同ノ案ヲ當局大臣ト問フ質問應答ニ盡シタリ今其ノ概要
述ベルハ次ノ如シ

一從來御諮詢案件ニ關スル外交文書ニ頻々誤謬ナリ本案條約ニ
就キモ原又サニ數多ク誤寫ニシテ爲内閣ニ於テ經同ノ上ニ訂正
手續ヲ了ラシムル此ハ畢竟事務取扱上疎漏ニ出ルモノニテ頗ル遺憾
トスル所ナルヲ以テ此點ニ付當局大臣ニ於テ遺憾ヲ表シ將來注
意加ヘ另々訂正スル期スル旨ヲ陳ヘ尙伊太利全權委員姓名
脱字ノ原本誤謬ニ由ルモノニテ訂正スルニ能ハルヲ以テ其儘之
ニ處理スルノ外ナルニト附言セリ

一 本條約ノ調印ニ先キ俄カ全權委員ヨリノ聲明ニ於テ内閣ニ於テ
同訓ヲ發スル際海軍軍令部長同意ヲ經タリヤ否ヤ(海軍軍ニ手續
屬スルヤ如キ觀アシトモ國志ニ極メテ重要ナル問題ナリ然レニ内閣ハ此
手續ヲ經スニテ同訓ヲ發シタリト宣傳セリト海軍部内ノ紛議ヲ
未ダ當義日ノ帝國議會ニ於テ所謂統帥權問題ナルモノヲ生ズルニ
至リ其ノ後海軍大臣ハ海軍兵力ニ關スル事項ハ從來慣行ニ
依リテ處理スル此ノ場合ニ於テハ海軍大臣海軍軍令部
長間ニ意見一致シアルベキモノトノ允裁ヲ仰キ御裁可ノ
後内閣總理大臣ニ右ノ之ヲ報告シ且今後其ノ又ニ據

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(本官、照會ヲ得、内閣總理大臣ニ於テ之カハ、領ヲ同答
 ンタル事實、海軍大臣、提示ニテ、文書ニ依リテ明瞭トナシ、
 仍、本官等、此ノ問題、是相ヲ究明スルノ極メテ、所要ナリトシ、
 先、當時、海軍大臣事務管理タリ、内閣總理大臣、兵
 力量ノ協定、其ノ内容トスル、則、陳詞訓案ニ依リ、軍令部
 長、同意アルコト必要ト思惟シタルカ、價向ニタルニ、同大臣、従来
 慣行ヲ重シ、兩者ノ間ニ意見、一致アルコト必要ト思惟シタルコト、
 答辯セリ、續テ、事實果シテ、此ノ兩者ノ間ニ意見、一致アリタリヤ
 ト、價向ニ対シ、軍令部長、当初、我カ三大原則、人作戦計画
 上、最小限度ノ要求ナリ、故ニ、以、要求ヲ充ササル米國要素ヲ骨
 子トスル兵力量ニ対シ、作戦用兵ノ量、生々トシ、同意ベシ、難
 キ旨ヲ主張シタルモ、其ノ後、是ニ於テ、議殿ノ事情ニ照ハストキ、同訓ニ
 際、政府ノ處置ニ対シ、結局、同官ニ異議ナカリシモノト認メ
 タリト答辯アリタリ、然レトモ、本官等、此ノ答辯ニ、幾多ノ疑念
 ヲ抱キ、親シク、則、軍令部長、陳述ヲ聴カント欲シ、内閣ニ対シ、其ノ
 公衆説明手續ヲ執ラムコトヲ要求シタルモ、内閣ハ之ヲ拒絶セ
 リ、又、本官等、此ノ問題ニ関スル議會ノ價向ニ対シ、國務大臣
 會議ノ意見ヲ斟酌シ、政府ニ於テ決定シタリト答辯ニ、故
 テ、同意、又ハ意見、一致ト言ハセリ、理由如何ト價向ニ、
 是、内閣總理大臣、軍令部長ト、關係、内容ハ、議會ニ
 於テ詳説スルコト好ミ、カラスト思惟シタルカ、當時、二新聞ニ、
 リト答(タ)ヒ、日ヲ辯明セリ、向、在、條約ノ調印ニ臨ミ、海軍大臣、
 此、既、全權委員、條約案ノ内容ニ、海軍軍令部長ニ異議
 アリト思惟セリ、ヤト、價向ニ対シ、海軍大臣、當時、海軍軍人
 ニ若干ノ不満アリタル事ハ、之ヲ知シ、モ彼等ト雖モ、會議、決別
 ヲ賭シ、之ニモ反対スルモ、ニ非サルベシト思惟シタリト答辯セリ

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140.9

然らば何故ニ軍令部長ノ意見ヲ確カルノ與テ持テ出テ
 リニカト又同ニタル同大臣ハ政府ニハ田中大臣事務官管理
 スルヲ自令ハ唯全權委員ノ人トシテ政府訓令ニ從ニ調印
 タルニ加ヘ同訓令時受領セシ軍令部長ハ電報ニ由リ
 寧日同部長ハ同訓令未ニ同意セシモノト解ニテ言フ以外
 辯

セリ。
 政府ハ我々国防ニ要スル兵方量ノ最小限度ト主張セリ所
 謂ニ三原則ニ適合ヤルニ妥協案ヲ承認シタリ事情ニ關シ政
 府ハ固ヨリ該案ノ其ノ意ニ滿タサル廉アリテ認ムルモ前未
 決ニ經過ニ徴シ他ニ適當ナル協定ヲ得ルノ見込ナク萬一會議
 決別ノ場合其ノ帝國ノ國際的立場ニ及ボス影響甚大ニ容
 易ナラサルト反シ艦艇數多主因ニ帝國財政經濟上ノ苦難甚
 大ニナリト案ニ相列シ即チ國家ノ大局ヨリ見テ之ヲ承認
 スルノ外ナキモノト由リ性ニ言フ辯明セリ然ラハ本條約ニ依
 リ兵方量ヲ以テテ帝國國防安全ヲ期スルコトヲ得ルヤ否ヤ之
 ヲ問ヘ大臣ニ復問シタルニ田中大臣ハ右兵力量ヲ以テテ八
 年來ノ國防方針ニ基テテ作戦計畫ノ維持遂行上或ハ困難
 アラハ元一區ニ輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦ニ於テ豫期以上ノ保有量ヲ獲
 得セリテ更ニ他區ニ代換建造ノ權利ヲ以テテ行使スルノ外別
 ハ既備艦艇整備並ニ改良者制限外艦艇ノ整備並ニ空
 機擴張並ニ所謂陸軍ノ充實ヲ圖リ且兵員ノ訓練整頓
 改善並ニ組定實ニ増加者所謂術方ノ向上ニ由ルニ於テハ
 略國防ノ安全ヲ期スルコトヲ得ヘシト信ス殊ニ本條約ノ有效期
 間ハ僅ニ五六年ノ短日月ニ過キス而モ帝國ノ主張ニ依リ次
 會議ニ於テ本條約ノ規定ニ拘束セラルルコトナク全ク自
 由ニ立場ニ於テ會議ヲ得ル趣旨規定ヲ本條約第三條

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但書ニ設ケタルヨリ本條約ニ付多少不滿ノ點アリトスルモ
將來ニ於テ困難ナカラシキ補正シ得ルノ途ナキニ非ヌト云々辯ヤリ
本條約ノ規定ニ依リ米國カ大巡洋艦十隻ヲ保有スル事トセ
ル者三千六百噸ニ至ル大巡洋艦ニ於テ帝國ノ對米比率ニ若
シテ遞減シテ其カ國防上最モ不安ヲ來スル殊ニ恰モ其ノ際
支那問題ニ關シ日米間事端ヲ發生スル虞アルベシト説キ
ニ非ヌ本官等ハ此ノ點ニ憂念應ニ當局ノ所見ヲ傳ヘタルニ當局
大佐ハ本條約ノ満期直後ニ滿ツル爲メ規定ノ許ス範圍内ニ於
テ豫メ準備ヲ整正シ且滿期後新艦ノ建造ヲ促進スルニ於テ艦
ト比率ヲ增高セシムルヲ得ヘリ其ノ間ニ於テ米國カ帝國ニ對
シテ事ヲ構フル虞アルモノト曰ク考ヘテ殊ニ本條約ノ締結
ニ因リ國交ノ範圍滿ト爲ルヘキヲ以テ戰爭ノ憂ナカルベシト辯明
ヤリ

當局ハ本條約ニ依リ其カ力量ノ不足ヲ次回會議ノ結果ニ依リ
補充シ得ルカ如クニ説明スト雖帝國ハ既ニ一タヒ華盛頓會
議ニ於テ主力艦ノ保有量ニ付米七割ヲ要求シテ否レシ
トシ今又倫敦會議ニ於テ大巡洋艦ノ保有量ニ付七割
及潜水艦ノ現有量維持ヲ要求シテ亦失敗ニ終リシ以此如クニ
シテ次回ノ會議ニ臨ミ益々同様ノ主張ヲ貫徹スルニ困難

No. 10

ヲ來スベキ之ヲ懸念スルニ難キヲ殊ニ本條約第三十三條
但書ハ法理上全然無意味ノ規定ナルカ如キニテ同條
ノ本文ニ依リハ千九百三十五年ノ會議ノ範圍(軍備制限縮小ノ
漸進的實現)ヲ遂行スル爲メ新條約ヲ作成スルニ在リテ以テ軍備
擴張ト認メラルルカ如キ右ノ主張殊ニ潜水艦ノ保有量ヲ増大
スルノ要求同條ノ精神ニ反ストヤリ之ヲ貫徹スルコト能ハレ
ル虞ナキヤ仍テ此ノ點ニ關スル不審ヲ須シタルニ當局大佐ハ

次河、會議ニ於テ帝國父老從前ノ三大原則ヲ主張セザ
ルヘカラサルニ非ス今後數年間ニ於ケル諸般事情ノ變化ヲ
斟酌シ最善ノ方策ヲ立テテ之ヲ主張ス貴僚ニ努メテ今又
假ニ所謂三大原則、主張ヲ繰返ストスルモ補助艦、總噸數及
建造費額ニ於テ本條約ニ依リモトテ超過セサル(キニ由リ之ヲ以テ
直ニ軍備擴張ト目スベキニ非スト答辯セリ、
又本條約ニ依ル兵力量ニハ缺陷アリ以テ適宜ニ補充計画ヲ立
ツルニ非サレバ我々國防ノ安全ヲ期シ得サル(キ事ハ政府、自ラ認
ム所ナリ、然ラバ右補充計画、成否如何之ニ要スル費額如
何本條約ニ因テ生スベキ剩餘金如何並ニ國民負擔輕減、
有無及其程度如何ノ問題ハ本條約ノ目的ヲ達成シ得ルヤ
否ヤヲ判斷スルニ於テ極メテ重要事項ニ屬シ正ニ審査、
要目タルニ由リ其ノ大綱、提示ヲ要求セリ、然ルニ之ニ答
レテ當局大臣、辯明ハ國防補充計画ハ海軍省令致ニ於テ
調査中ニ係リ以テ該調査完了ノ後海軍省ト、同ニ意見一致
スルニ後更ニ閣僚省同ニ協議ヲ要スルニ非サレバ之ヲ明確トシ
タリト能ハレバ故ニ其ノ確定時期、早クトモ今秋豫算編成
ヲ了スルノ頃ニハ但當局トシテ本條約實施結果財政上租
當ノ餘裕ヲ生スベキヲ以テ其ノ一環之ヲ國防ノ缺陷補充ニ充テ
他ノ一部ハ之ヲ國民負擔ノ輕減ニ充ツルニ方針ナルコトヲ茲ニ
責任ヲ以テ言明ス(シ)而シテ海軍、既定計画トシテ昭和七年
度ヨリ同十年度迄ノ財政計画ニ留保スル金額總計約
五億圓ヲ假ニ其左様トシテ充ツルトキハ本條約ニ依リテ豫算建造
ノ權利ヲ全數行フモ尚若キノ剩餘金ヲ生スベキヲ以テ之ヲ適
當ニ國防補充費ト輕減トニ安排スルノ胸算ナリト謂フニ在リ
復問應答、大要右、如シ之ヲ要スルニ本條約ノ實施費

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No. 11

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條約ヲ訂補シ着て海軍軍備制限ノ目的ヲ達成スル爲各種
艦船ニ関シ諸般ノ制限ヲ協定セラルモナリ抑国防安全
ハ國家興亡ノ繫に所ナリ故ニ條約ヲ以テ軍備ノ制限ヲ約束ス
ル妙キハ最モ慎重ナリ考慮ヲ要スル事項ナリ由來我國軍事
ニ関シ軍政上事々ト區別シ各別異ノ様態ヲ設ケニ之
ニ關スル大権行動ノ輔翼ニ協力セラルモ洵ニ以テ是非ナリ
然ルニ今日本條約調印ノ際内閣ノ報リタル同訓決定ノ手續
ニ關シ海軍部内ニ紛議ヲ生シ茲ニ世間ニ物議ヲ醸スニ至リタル
ハ洵ニ遺憾トスヘキ所ナリモ内閣ニ於テ右同訓決定ノ際莫令
長ニ異議ナリシモノト認メタリト答辯アリタルニナラズ
海軍大臣ヨリ海軍ノ兵力ニ關スル事項ノ決定ハ海軍大臣海軍
軍令部長間ノ意見一致ヲ要件トスルコトノ勅裁ヲ仰キ御
裁可ノ後内閣總理大臣ニ報告シ今後其之ニ據ルヘキ旨
ノ照會ヲ爲シ同大臣ヨリ受領ノ回答ヲ得タルヲ以テ今ヤ所屬
統帥權問題ナリモ一更ニ討究スルノ必要ナキニ至リ是レ在官
手ノ頗ル欣幸トスル所ナリ更ニ本條約ノ目的ヲ見ルニ其世界
本和ヲ念ヒテ競争的軍備ニ伴フ危險ヲ防止シ且負擔
輕減ヲ圖ラントスル趣旨ニ於テハ勿論何人ト雖モ之ヲ賛同ヲ各
々キニ非ス唯帝國ノ關スル限リ本條約所定ノ兵力量ニ由リ東
洋取テ国防ニ缺陷ヲ生スルコトナリ右ノ目的ヲ達成スルコト
ヲ得ルヤ否ヤ是レ本條約ノ可否ヲ判定スルニ最モ重要ナル論
點ナリ故ニ在官等ハ之ニ関シ特ニ慎重ナル調査ヲ試ミ
リ然ルニ當局大臣ハ本條約所定ノ兵力量ニ於テハ缺陷
コトヲ認ケルモ之ヲ補充ノ方法ヲ講ズルニ由リテ略国防ノ安全
ヲ期シ得ヘシト爲ス其ノ補充計畫ニ至リテハ未ダ調査受
ルセサル故ヲ以テ其ハ大體要目ヲモ示サズ從テ之ニ要スル

No. 12

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No. 13

費額及減稅額、見、之、亦、多、ク、説明、ヲ、具、ス、唯、政、府、
 責、任、ハ、以、テ、国防、之、缺、陥、ヲ、補、充、シ、且、相、當、ノ、減、稅、ヲ、行、フ、今、午、二、日、ヲ、言、
 明、ヤ、リ、然、レ、ト、モ、本、官、等、ノ、国防、ヲ、補、充、計、画、ハ、本、来、國、務、大、臣、下、
 軍、令、機、關、ト、合、意、ニ、由、リ、テ、決、定、セ、ラ、レ、ル、(キ、モ、一、ニ、テ、獨、リ、
 國、務、大、臣、ノ、責、任、ニ、於、テ、言、明、シ、得、(キ、モ、一、ニ、非、サ、ル、カ、故、ニ、該、問、題、
 ニ、對、シ、公、衆、口、實、機、關、ノ、意、見、ハ、本、官、等、ノ、判、断、ヲ、不、タ、三、有、力、ナ、ル、
 資、料、ト、爲、ル、ヘ、キ、ヲ、思、フ、何、モ、カ、ノ、方、法、ニ、依、リ、テ、之、ノ、意、見、ヲ、
 聽、カ、ム、コ、ト、ヲ、抑、止、シ、最、後、三、軍、事、兵、議、院、ノ、答、答、文、ヲ、示、
 ス、ノ、手、續、ヲ、執、ラ、ム、コ、ト、ヲ、國、務、大、臣、ニ、請、求、シ、タ、ル、ニ、大、臣、ハ、之、ヲ、
 拒、絶、セ、リ、元、來、外、務、大、臣、ノ、説、明、ニ、依、リ、(キ、本、條、約、ハ、米、國、ニ、於、テ、條、
 ニ、之、カ、批准、ノ、手、續、ヲ、了、シ、タ、ル、モ、英、國、ハ、批准、ハ、妥、當、ニ、關、シ、本、
 年、十、月、以、前、ニ、到、ラ、サ、シ、メ、完、了、セ、ラ、レ、ル、カ、故、ニ、假、ニ、帝、國、力、今、日、之、
 ヲ、批准、ス、ル、モ、直、ニ、其、ノ、効、力、ヲ、發、生、セ、ラ、レ、キ、ヲ、以、テ、本、官、等、ハ、本、條、約、締、
 結、ノ、結、果、モ、帝、國、ノ、利、害、ニ、及、ボ、ス、影、響、有、リ、甚、大、ナ、ル、ヲ、稽、メ、暫、ク、假、ニ、
 時、日、ヲ、以、テ、之、ヲ、前、述、ノ、國、務、大、臣、計、畫、等、付、キ、局、ノ、調、査、略、定、シ、
 ル、ヲ、俟、テ、徐、ニ、審、議、ヲ、進、ム、ノ、意、ニ、決、シ、タ、ル、ヲ、思、フ、之、ヲ、以、テ、同、大、臣、ニ、
 提、議、シ、タ、ル、モ、之、亦、其、ノ、同、意、ス、ル、所、ト、爲、ラ、ス、斯、ハ、如、キ、潛、思、默、慮、
 ヲ、以、テ、ス、ル、本、官、等、ノ、甚、ク、遺憾、ト、シ、タ、ル、ニ、國、務、大、臣、ノ、説、明、ニ、
 所、ニ、依、リ、近、時、國、内、情、勢、大、ニ、憂、慮、ス、(キ、モ、一、項、ハ、本、條、約、批、
 准、ノ、成、否、永、ク、未、定、ニ、ト、シ、政治、上、經濟、上、不、安、ヲ、惹、起、シ、
 社會、ニ、及、ボ、ス、影、響、甚、大、ニ、ヘ、キ、ヲ、高、唱、セ、ラ、レ、タ、ル、カ、故、ニ、本、官、等、
 今、日、ノ、場、合、此、ノ、問、題、ニ、付、テ、如、キ、審、査、程、度、於、テ、結、局、
 局、ノ、言、書、ニ、付、預、メ、決、議、ヲ、爲、ス、外、ナ、キ、モ、ト、新、
 定、ス、ル、ニ、至、リ、其、他、本、條、約、ノ、條、項、ニ、關、シ、大、体、於、テ、支、
 障、ノ、虞、ナ、シ、ト、認、ム、ヲ、以、テ、此、ノ、際、本、條、約、ヲ、承認、ス、ル、最、終、
 決、定、ヲ、行、フ、ハ、レ、ト、思、フ、得、ヤ、ル、所、ナ、リ、ト、思、科、ス、仍、

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二

14.14

審査委員會、於、本院、國務大臣、軍部、協調整、
國、補充計畫、遂行、且國民負擔、輕減、實行、
本條約、目的、達成、スル、意旨、ナキ、期、スト、言、責、信、賴、
ニ、本件、可、決、ス、ヘ、キ、ト、全會、一致、以、テ、議、決、シ、リ、
右、謹、テ、審、査、結、果、報、告、ス、
四、審、査、總、意、本、日、議、題、タル、ロ、ド、ニ、海、軍、條、約、御、批、准、
件、對、シ、此、島、會、同、軍、事、政、府、所、見、ヲ、申、述、シ、テ、今、同、ロ、
ド、ニ、海、軍、條、約、ニ、准、シ、今、各、員、長、ヨリ、御、報、告、アリ、タ、リ、通、
世、界、ノ、平、和、ヲ、念、ト、シ、發、達、的、軍、備、ヲ、行、フ、危、險、ヲ、所、止、シ、且、
國、民、負、担、ヲ、輕、減、シ、因、ル、趣、旨、ニ、出、テ、タ、ル、モ、ニ、テ、日、英、米、佛、
伊、五、國、代、表、者、ノ、著、名、調、印、セ、ル、ト、シ、カ、其、ノ、中、日、英、米、
三、國、ノ、間、ス、ル、限、リ、量、表、ニ、ツ、キ、ト、シ、會、議、及、ヒ、テ、不、一、シ、會、
議、於、テ、實、現、ヲ、見、ル、ニ、至、ラ、ザ、リ、シ、補、助、艦、制、限、ヲ、協、定、ス、ル、
成、切、ニ、各、艦、種、ニ、對、シ、テ、制、限、ヲ、實、行、ス、ル、ト、ヲ、得、ル、ニ、至、リ、タ、
リ、又、未、補、助、艦、保、有、量、制、限、ニ、關、ス、ル、協、定、ニ、主、カ、艦、
協、定、ニ、比、シ、一、層、複、雜、ト、シ、同、題、ヲ、會、同、ロ、ド、ニ、會、議、
於、テ、モ、之、カ、論、議、ニ、參、加、シ、迂、餘、曲、折、ヲ、終、ニ、俾、テ、各、方、
見、ル、ト、ヲ、得、サ、リ、シ、モ、日、英、米、三、國、ノ、大、局、ヲ、考、察、シ、テ、互、讓、妥、
協、以、テ、其、成、立、ヲ、見、ス、ル、次、第、ナ、リ、仍、テ、今、同、條、約、中、補、助、艦、
保、有、量、ニ、關、ス、ル、協、定、結、果、ニ、我、ノ、要、求、全、部、滿、足、ヲ、與、
フ、ル、ニ、至、ラ、ス、即、チ、我、ノ、決、定、國、所、方、針、ニ、基、キ、安、定、意、義、セ、ラ、ル、ヲ、頭、
作、戰、計、畫、ニ、維、持、遂、行、ニ、兵、力、量、ノ、不、足、ヲ、生、ズ、ル、ト、シ、
此、ノ、缺、陷、ハ、別、ニ、適、宜、ニ、補、充、途、ヲ、講、シ、テ、國、防、上、ニ、支、障、ヲ、
生、ズ、シ、メ、サ、ル、ト、ヲ、得、ル、ト、シ、
一、致、ニ、決、シ、テ、其、補、充、計、畫、目、下、當、局、ニ、於、テ、慎重、改、
定、中、ニ、屬、シ、テ、未、タ、之、カ、具、體、的、數、字、ヲ、示、ス、ル、ト、ヲ、得、ル、場、

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合ニ至ラスト雖要スルニ内容、充實及術力、向上ヲ主
 眼トスルモノ、ニシテ其、大綱要目、審査委員會於海軍
 大臣ヨリ説明シタル所、如之而シテ海軍、既長計畫トシ
 昭和六年度ヨリ同十一年度迄、財政計畫且ニ確保シテ
 タル金額、總計約五億圓ナルヲ故ニ之ヲ以テ本條約依
 ル代換建造及前述べタル量、補充ニ要スル經費ト國
 民負擔、輕減トシ通宜分配セラル本條約ニ對シ御承
 知ノ通米國、歐ニ批准ヲシ英帝國ニ於テ全英聯盟
 各邦、大部合ニ批准ヲシ若ハ其、準備完了ニ准リ
 ラントシ同ニ其、批准手續、本年十一月同國通商議
 會、南會ヲ得ヘキヤ又ハ之ヨリモ早ク批准ヲシ得ヘキ
 便法アリヤ未タ何トモ確報ニ接セスト雖結局其、批准
 ニ故障ヲ生ズルモノト、相像ニ得ラヌ又此、審査報告中國
 務大臣、答辭トシ揚グルタル部分ニ我々、説明趣旨元
 分ニ徹底ニ居ラカレ固所アルヤニ考ヘラレモ事煩瑣ニ互ニ嫌
 アルヲ以テ茲ニ一ト之ヲ指摘セシメテ之ヲ要スルニ此、際政府トシテ、
 内外、情勢ニ鑑ミ速ニ本意、可決セラシムコトヲ望ム次
 第ナリ

No. 15

三十六番(石井) 今回御諮詢、マニトシ海軍條約ニ付余
 去ル八月十五日其、關係書類ヲ受領セリ是ヨリ失議
 長ヨリ審査委員ヲ指定セラシ書類ニ至ル今本員ト同
 時ニ配付セラシタルト思料ス長シ固ヨリ当然、事ナレモ
 從來、取扱ハ必モ然ラヌ故ニ余ハ曾テ御諮詢、蒙ル者
 顧問官金敏ニ以テ御諮詢アラ直ニ其、全員カ
 書類拜見、義務アリ即チ成ルヘク速ニ書類ヲ配付セラ
 タントノ意見ヲ述ベタルニトアリ今回、書類配付、此、見

Dac 99/

No. 16

地より見、樞密院、議事、一改善ナルヲ思ヒ満足、意ヲ表
ス更ニ龍ヲ得テ蜀ヲ望ム、感アルトモ、茲ニ議長ニ希望ス
ヘキ事ナリ、余、本件書目類ヲ受取リタルニ、前述、如ク、八月十五
日、大カ其、御諮詢アリタル、七月二十四日ナレ、其、間ニ既ニ三週
間ヲ経過セリ、モ、ナリ、此、重大案件、御諮詢アリタルニ、對シ、樞
密院、何ヲ爲シ居タルカ、天下輿論トシテ不審、聲ヲ放
余モ亦不審ニ思ヒタル一人ナリ、キ、此、間ニ於テ、新聞紙、及、各、方
面ヨリ、報道ニ依リ、議長、本件、御下付後、十日ヲ終タル、八
月、十六日、頃、内閣總理大臣ニ對シ、軍事ヲ、議院、奉答文、
提シ、求メタルニ、總理大臣、之ヲ拒絶セリト、モ、ナリ、大カ其、後、尙
一週間ヲ終テ、本員會組織セリ、此、如ク、シテ、前後三週間、ハ
顧問官トシテ、御諮詢ヲ蒙リ、下ラ、其、案、内容ヲ知能、
サルナリ、余、此、如キ、重大案件ニ付、御諮詢ヲ蒙リ、タル、以上、
直ニ議案ヲ配付シ、成ヘク、速ニ審査、本員會ヲ開ク、ヘキモ、
一ニ、シテ、尙、同ニ對シ、請求ス、ヘキモ、ア、ハ、顧問官相談、上之ヲ
請求スルヲ可ト信ス、余、既ニ、謝リ、テ、議長、行動ヲ非難
セムトスル者ニ非ス、只、天皇、至高、顧問府、ナル、本院、權威
高ム、爲、將來ニ向テ、議長、御注意ヲ望ム、次第ナリ、此、矣
ニ付、議長ヨリ、御辯明アリ、承ラム
議長(倉庫) 只、今、三十六番ヨリ、書類配付ニ付、希望御
申出アリタル、本官ヨリ、更メテ、言フ、迄、モ、ナリ、樞密院事務、初
現程、第七條ニ、審査報告書、ハ、附屬文書ト、共ニ、其、
會議、開ク、日ヨリ、少ク、モ、三日以前ニ、之ヲ、各員ニ、配付ス、ヘシ
ト、シ、從來、此、現定ニ、依リ、報告書、提出後、三日以前ニ、配
布セリ、下、得、此、現定、絶対的、モ、ト、考ヘ、ス、場合、依
リ、實際、便宜上、審査終リ、前ニ、配布スルモ、違法ト、

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No. 17

用ハス又議案若漸ナル場合等ニ前以テ配付タル事例
アリ本付ニ付テモ亦然リ而シテ此、事多ク概ニ本院、ミ、都
令ニ依ルヘニ非ス政府ト、關係ヲモ考慮スル、必要アリ
以テ、今同ニ政府當局ト、打合タル上ニテ、右、変則、取扱、為
シタル事、故ニ今後、ヤ、モ、母ニ、今同、如キ、取扱、為スモ、ト、
限ラヌ又又三十六番、本官、軍事多議院、奉答文ヲ求
ムルニ、為ニ、審査ヲ遅延シタルカ、如ク、述ヘラシムルモ、ハ、事實ニ相
違ヒ、本官、該文書、提示ヲ要求シタルニ、非ス、シテ、勸告
タル、ミ、又、大カ、為ニ、審査ヲ遅延セシタルニ、非ス、委員長
報告ニ、在ニ、通リ、兎角、議案、文書、誤謬アリ、今同、モ、之
カ、訂正ニ、付、政府、於テ、経過、手續ヲ、履ミタル、為、十、余、日ヲ
経過セリ、此等、審査、為シ、必要ナル、手續ニ、シテ、又、審査、終
了、待テ、配付スル、事例、トスル、ト、前陳、如ク、七、三、十
六番、御説、ハ、當ラヌ
三十六番（石井）書類、配付、同、ニ、樞密院、事務、現程、
現長、余、モ、亦、之ヲ、知リ、但シ、同、現定、ハ、報告、書、ト、共ニ
ト、アリ、テ、報告、書、ト、同時ニ、ト、ナシ、且、常識、ヨリ、見ル、モ、豫
メ、配付、シ、不可ナル、事ナシ、而シテ、今同、議長、方、配付、時期
ヲ、早メラシタルニ、由リ、今後、モ、此、例ニ、依ラシム、ト、ヲ、希望シタル
ノ、ミ、余、既、往、事ヲ、言ハス、將來ニ、付テ、言ヘル、ナリ、然ルニ、只
今、御、辨明ニ、依リ、將來、雖、重大、案件ニ、付テ、ハ、文書ヲ
締密ニ、調査スル、為、數、週、間ヲ、延ス、ヤ、モ、知シ、スト、コトナル、カ
余、將來ニ、付、憂、慮、ナキ、能ハス、宜ラ、案件、御、下、付、後
直ニ、委員、會ヲ、設ケ、之ヲ、シテ、調査セム、ハ、然ラ、ハ、願
問、官ト、政府、當局者ト、共ニ、調、テ、訂正ス、（キ、モ、ハ、訂正

No. 18

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スヘキナリト云々書記官長及其補助者ヲコシ幾日カヲ
議案、調査ニ専任サシメ誤植、訂正ヲ了シタル後ニ非サシハ
配付セスト謂フ如キ事鄭重ニ過キ取扱上適宜ナリト謂
フヘカラス然レトモ此問題ニ付テハ最早此ノ上言議ヲ專員
ササレハ唯余ニ極密院將來ヲ思ヒ茲ニ微衷ヲ述ヘ
タル意見徹底セサリシトテ遺憾トス
(次頁ニ續ク)

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No. 19

之ヨリ政府ニ對シテ問ハ先ノ所謂三大原則ニ関シ
報告書ニ帝國政府、既定ノ國防方針ニ基キ
……三大原則ヲ定メトアルニ依リテ見ハ三大
原則ハ今同ノロンドン會議ニ臨ミ定メラル
モノ、如シ故ニ該原則ハ我カ全權委員ニ對シ
ル訓令中ニ无勿論掲ケラルモノナルニ海
軍大臣以下海軍官憲ハ此ノ會議前ニ於テ大ニ
左右三大原則ヲ高調シ之ヲ以テ我カ國防ノ最
低限度ト爲シ之ヲ缺クトキハ國防危シト公衆
ヲ教育セラルカ也、故ニ専門知識ナキ社會
一般ハ之ヲ信シ若シ耶タリトモ該原則ニ缺クル
トアルハカ戦争必敗ナリトテ大ニ憂慮シ
余モ亦之ヲ憂慮スル一人ナリ然ルニ報告書
ニ依ハ次同ノ會議ニ於テ必シモ該原則ヲ以
テ臨ムヘシトハ限ラストノコトナルカ故ニ是心ナルモ
世間カ米國ヲ恐ルル原因ノ畢竟此ノ原則ニ
在リテ以テ茲ニ之ヲ明瞭ナラシムルハ必要アリ
會ニ於テ考フルニ此ノ三大原則ハ前ノシツネ
會議、際ニハ之ナカリカ也、故ニ同會議ニ於
テ日本全權委員カ英米全權委員ニ提議シ
タル所ヲ簡單ニ一言セムニ同會議ニ際シ日本
全權委員カ又ケタル訓令中ニハ今向、如キ三
大原則ハ示サレサリキ然ルニ會議ニ於テ、米國
ハ英國ト均勢ヲ欲シ英國ハ其特殊地位
ニ鑑ミ多數ノ洋艦ヲ受スルニ由リ補助艦
總噸數ハ十二萬噸ヲ必要トスト主張シ日

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本、保有量ヲ引下ケムトシ談判
テ日本側ハ已テ得ス英米ノ水上補助艦ヲ四
十六万噸迄引下ケヨ之ニ對シ日本ハ三十一万
噸迄引下ケルノ用意アリト提議セリ之ニ對シ
米國側ハ主義トシテ同意シタルモ英國側ハ
同意セズ仍テ日本、カキ中將米國ノ
ルビト研究ノ結果一ニ妥協案ヲ作リタルモ
會議ノ協定ヲ見ルニエラス而シテ潜水艦ニ
付テハ日英米各十萬噸トストノコトナリキ而
シテ今向ノロビトニ會議ノ成果ハ右ツコト
會議ニ於ケル日本、提議ニ近似セル非ス
ルニ世間ニハ本條約ニ依リ日本ハ英米ヨリ無
理ナル比率ヲ強ヒラセリトテ不滿ヲ唱フル者
多キヲ貴族トス海軍當局ハ宜シク自國ノ協
成立ニ付何等英米ノ壓迫ナカリシトテ國
民ニ周知セムヘカリナリ

16.20

次ニ所謂三大原則ハ何時ヨリ始マリタルモ
！ナルヤ昭和二年頃ニハ本々之ナカリシガ
現ニソビネーヅノ會議ニ際シテハ潜水艦ニ付テ
天我カ軍事當局ハ我カ保有量トシテ六萬噸
ヲツテ差支ナシト認メタルニ非スヤ其後三
年間ニ於テ國際關係惡化タリトモ覺ス
却テ不戰條約成立シ平和關係ニシテ進
リタルモ、ト謂ハサルヘカラス然ルニ今同ノ會議
ニ於テ我カ當局ハ右ノ潜水艦保有量一十六萬噸
！上ニ更ニ一萬八千噸ヲ増加シタル大ニ八萬噸

16.21
 此等理由不可解ナリ又国防補充計ニ付テハ要ナリトシテ要求
 付テ惑ヲ抱フナリ又国防補充計ニ付テハ要ナリトシテ要求
 ハ要員具會報告書中ニモ總理大臣ノ説明中
 無適當ナル補充方法アルカモ求ムベシ
 付ルモ何ラモ適當トシタラバ惟ニ潜水艦保有量ニ
 帝國ハ昭和二年ニ於テ六千噸ヲ主張シ今
 已ラ得テ五萬二千噸ヲ承認シタルコトナリ
 其差六千噸ハ論議上我カ国防ノ缺陷ト謂
 得シ往年米國ハ潜水艦ニ付テ五五三
 一比率ヲ主張シタルニ今日本ハ均等ヲ承認シ
 ルヲ以テ見レバ彼モ讓歩シタルモノト見ル
 其、他水上補助艦ニ付テハ英米今同ノ提案
 先年我カ提議シタル所ノ英米今同ノ提案
 余、我カ国防補充計畫ニ西セシテ經費ニ
 三百萬圓ヲ以テ足ルベク保衛財源五億圓中
 ヲリ之ヲ差引キ甚ク殘額ハ凡テ國民員中
 擔、輕減ニ充ツルコト適當ナルノミナラス我カ
 海軍從來ノ主張ト一致スルモノト思惟ス我カ
 スルニ三大原則ノ何時ニ至ルモ既定ノ國防方針
 トテ不可動ノモノト爲リタリ又國防針
 補充計畫ニ際シ具體ニテ御説明ヲ均シモ主義
 程度ニ付海軍側ノ御説明ヲ均シモ主義
 以上ノ實況希望ヲ外ニシ今向ノ條約各國
 ヲリ何等壓迫ヲ受ケタルモノニ非ス今向ノ
 英米ノ提案、我國カ三年前ニ提議シタル

Doc 89

10.22

所ニ係リ我ニ於テも此迄受諾スベキモノナリ
故ニ余ハ之ニ賛成ス而シテ本委員長報告ノ
未段ニ於ケル本院ハ國務大臣ノ主ト責任ニ信
頼シテ本件ヲ可決ストノ結論ニモ全然同意
意ヲ表スルモノナリ
五番(財政部)御質問、第一、三大原則ナルモノ
ハ昭和二年「ジュネーヴ」會議ノ際ハ之ナリ
シカ其ハ如何時出来タルカト謂フニ在リカ
シ血論「ジュネーヴ」會議ノ時ニハ三大原則如
ナルモノナク今同ト雖正確ニ言ハル之ヲ明
白ニ掲ゲテ全權ニ訓令シ又形式ヲ以テ聲明
スルストナレ然ラハ何故世上ニ宣傳セラルニ至リ
タルカ抑「ジュネーヴ」會議ニ於テ帝國海軍ノ
力ハ最モ顧念スベキ假想敵國ノ大割ヲ要
スルモノト見テ主力艦ノ保有量ニ付テ率ヲ
保持セムトシタルモ結局之ニ達セシテ大割
ニ達スル者、所謂「太平洋防備」ノ現状維持ヲ
條件トシテ五五三、六六六、七五五「ジュネーヴ」
會議ニ於テモ大体補助艦ノ保有量ニ付テ大割
ヲ目金トシタルモ其ハ總括的ニ大割ニ止リ其割
内ニ金額、詳細ニ互ニサリシモノ潛水艦ニ付テ
言ハハ日本ノ主張ハ七万噸ニシテ即チ今回、七
万八千噸ト同一ニ歸ス其ハ故ハ「ジュネーヴ」
會議當時ニ於テハ百噸以下ノ潛水艦ハ無制限
ナリシヲ以テ我カハ百噸以下ノ潛水艦ヲ算入
セザリシヲ以テナリ要スニ日本ノ現有勢力

事明維持スルニ、主張ナリシナリ然ラハ日英
 専門委員間暫定妥協案ニ於テハ万噸均
 勢ト定ムルニ付我カ海軍中央部ニ於テ反
 對ナカリシカト言フニ大ニ反對論アリタリ當時ハ
 八吋巡洋艦ニ付テハ七割以上ヲ獲タルモ總括セ
 ニ割ニ率ニサレ故ヲ以テ非難論議セラルタリ故
 ニ今回之ニトシ會議ニ臨ミテモ我カ海
 軍ノ主張ニ同シ現有力ヲ保持スル必要ト
 スルニ在リタリ尤モ八吋巡洋艦ニ付テハ七割
 ヲ會議當時ニ於テハ各國共ニ今日之ニ
 重ヲ置カス從テ日本ノ保有量ハ比較的有利
 ニ認メラル程ナルカ今日新造ノモノハ戰鬥
 力優越ナルコト認メラルニ至リタル結果日本
 モ七割ヲ要求スル次第ナルモノトテ今日戰
 ニ作リタル方針ニ非ス而シテ所謂既定ノ
 方針トハ大正十二年ニ定マリタル國防方針
 ニ基テ作戦計畫ノ遂行上必要ナル兵力量
 ニ付テ明ナリ故ニ先ヅ總括七割八吋巡洋艦
 七割及潜水艦現有勢力ノ三者カ割合ヲ示ス
 ルナリ其ハ何シカ重要ナルカヲ示ス又ハ
 文書中ニモ三大厚則ト言ハス唯此ノ三者カ要
 求ノ主要ナル実ナルカ故ニ人々テ三大厚則ト
 謂フナリ固ヨリ海軍トシテハ之ニ重ヲ置
 キタリ而シテ石井顧問官御説ノ如クワシ
 ントシ會議ニ於テ主力艦七割ヲ要求ス
 シテ七割ト爲リ又「ジ」ネーヴ會議ノ時日

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No. 23

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No. 24

英艦定安妥協案ニ於テ補助艦六割ト爲リ
タルニトシテ今迄天多、年研究ヲ重シタル海軍
部内ニ於テモ我カ大割、要求ヲ貫徹スルニト、
困難ナルヲ知リ會議ニ際シニ當リ從前、經
二鑑ミ始テ三大原則ヲ以テ全權委員ニ
訓令シテ水陣ヲ布クトモ全權委員ニ
テ朝野、諒解ヲ得ルニ努メタル所アリ
之ヲ爲壯年、士官等諸方ニ出張講演シテ大ニ三大原則ヲ高
調シ中ニ以テ得セ、國モ之ニト云フカ如キ極端ナル言論ヲ
爲シタル者アリタルカ如シ而モ是、皆國ヲ害スル至誠ニ出タル
コトニシテ其、結果國論能ク一致シ會議ニ於テ總括的大割、
成果、如キ亦之ニ負ツナルモト思料スル石井顧問官、軍
部、於テ是、三大原則ヲ高調スルカ如ク、今日此、會議、結
果ニ付更ニ國民諒解ヲ得ルニ努メタルヲ以テ不稱トセラル
カ如キモノ、自ラ必要、程度アリ前、會議臨ミタル時ト今日
ト、場合ヲ異ニス、況ヤ次回、會議、事ヲ考慮スルニ於テヤ
次回、會議ニ於テ、其、時ニ於テ必要トスル所ヲ以テ今回以テ
ニ精査シ最善ノ方法ニ向テ努メカク爲スヘキモ凡ソ或時、主
張カヤシモ永久、モト、限ラズ現ニ米國、如キモ或時、潛
水艦、必要ヲ唱ヘ或時、之カ全廢設ヲ唱フルカ如キ狀
況ニシテ十年前ト今日ト、軍備ニ變化ヲ来セルトモアルヲ以
テ時宜ニ應ジ主張ニ變化ヲ来ストアルヘキ、亦當然、事
ナリ尚補充費用及國民負擔問題ニ關シ、總理大臣ヨリ答
辯セラルル所アル

四番演説 國防補充計畫及國民負擔輕減問題ニ付、
本員會報告書ヲ以テ本員會ニ於テ亦ヘシ政府、所信
ヲ詳シク述べ又

Doc 891

16.25

結論モ良ク書カレタルニ因リ茲ニ更メテ述フルノ要ナカ
ヘシ又石井顧問官モ強テ説明ヲ求メラルニ非サ
ルヘシ要スルニ補充計畫モ負擔輕減モ今日尙當
局ニ於テ熱心攷究中ニ屬シ未タ具體的數字ヲ述
ヘ得ル程度ニ至ラス而シテ補充計畫ノ要目ハ海軍
大臣カ委員會ニ於テ述ヘタル所ヲ報告書中ニ引用
セラレタル通ニシテ夫以上ノコトハ不明ニシテ今秋豫
算編成後ニ非サレハ確定セス不確實ノ事ヲ述フル
ヲ欲セサルヲ以テ今ハ此ノ程度ノ説明ニ止ムル外ナシ
三十六番(石井) 本官ハ敢テ政府ニ對シ具體的
計畫又ハ數字ノ説明ヲ求ムルニ非ス唯此ノ報
告書中ニハ補充計畫及負擔輕減ノ大體方針
ヲモ示サストアルモ只今總理大臣ハ委細説明セル
カ如ク述ヘラレタリ余ハ樞密院カ本安本御諮詢
ヲ蒙リタル以上委員會トシテ條約當面ノ目的
タル補充計畫及負擔輕減ニ付當局ニ質ス所ア
ルヘキハ當然ノコトナリト思料ス然ルニ其ノ大綱要目
ヲモ示サスト謂フニ至テハ餘リニ顧問官ヲシテ是
非ノ判定ニ困難ヲ感セムルモノト謂フヘシ只主義
トシテ大體如何ナル部分ハ補充費ニ充テ如何ナル
部分ハ負擔輕減ニ充ツルト云フカ如キ例ハ潛水
艦七千五百噸ノ不足ヲ基礎トスレハ何程補充ヲ
要スト云フカ如キ大體ノ目安ハ立チ得ルニ非スヤ
何令御説明ヲ求ム

四番(濱口) 先刻政府ノ所見トシテ述ヘタルカ如ク海
軍ノ既定計畫トシテ昭和六年度ヨリ同十一年度

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No. 26

迄留保セル金額總計約五億圓ニシテ之ヲ以テ本條
約ニ依ル代換建造並兵力量補充經費及國民負
擔輕減ニ充ツヘシテ此等ハ相互ニ關係ヲ有スルヲ
以テ同時ニ決定スルヲ要シ從テ豫算編成期ニ至ラ
サレハ判明ニ難キモノナリ然ラハ金額ヲ離レテ大綱
要目如何之ニ付テハ審査報告書二十三枚目ニ海軍
大臣ノ委員會ニ於ケル説明ヲ記載セル中ニ然ラハ
本條約ニ依ル兵力量ヲ以テテ帝國國防ノ安全ヲ期
スルコトヲ得ルヤ否ヤ之ヲ當局大臣ニ質シタル當
局大臣ハ兵力量ヲ以テテハ從來ノ國防方針ニ
基ク作戰計畫ノ維持遂行上或ハ困難アリムモ
面ニハ輕巡洋艦及驅逐艦ニ於テ豫期以上ノ保有
量ヲ獲得セルアリ更ニ他面ニハ代換建造ノ權利ヲ
適當ニ増ハ行スルノ外例ハ既成艦船ノ整備裝備
ノ改善制限外艦船ノ整備、航空機、擴張等所
謂内容ノ充實ヲ圖リ且兵員ノ訓練教養、改善、
乘組定員ノ増加等所謂術力、向上ニ努ムル等、補
充方法ヲ執ルニ於テハ略國防ノ安全ヲ期スルコトヲ
得ヘシト信スニアリたハ委員會ニ於ケル大綱要目
ノ説明ニシテ今日ニ於テモ此レ以上説明ノ材料ヲ有
セサルヲ遺憾トス故ニ此ノ程度ヲ以テ御了承ヲ乞フ
二十三番(五黑) 此ノ會議ヲ午後ニ續行セラルルヤ
議長(倉田) 此ノ上永引ク様ナレハ御都合ヲ伺ヒ
タル上ニテ午後ニ續行ニテ可ナリ。
二十三番(五黑) 本安否ニ付テハ委員各位ノ嚴正ナル
態度ヲ以テ今御精査ノ結果報告セラレタル所

Doc 891

No. 27

ニ依リ略テ解ニタルカ細目ニ至リテハ種々質問シタ
事項アリト併政府ノ答辯ヲ察スルニ委員會ニ於ケ
ル説明以上ニ及ハサルカ如シ故ニ余ハ委員會、報告
ヲ信シ質問ヲ差控エシ只報告書中ニ「國務大臣
ノ説明又ハ所ニ依リ近時國內ノ情勢大ニ憂慮ス
ヘキモノ現シ云々」トアリ其ノ意如何詳細ノ御説明
ヲ承リタシ

四番(覆) 「ロンド」條約ニ關シテハ樞府御諮詢
前ヨリ政界ニ及ホスヘキ影響等ニ付世上ニ兎角、
風評アリ事ヲ好ム徒之ニ和シテ種々臆説ヲ流布
シ爲ニ政界及財界ノ不安ヲ招クノ徵候アリタルカ
七月二十四日愈々本條約ノ御諮詢ト爲リ樞府事務
局ノ下審査ヲ經テ八月十八日始メテ第一回ノ審査
委員會開會セラシ爾來九月十七日ニ至ル迄日ヲ經
ルコト五十餘日委員會ヲ開クコト十二回其ノ間
都下ノ新聞紙ハ委員會ノ議事、秘密ニシテ其
ノ真相ヲ知ルコトヲ得サル爲ニ甚ニ揣摩臆測ヲ
逞ウシ種々ノ記事ヲ掲載シ事情ヲ知ラサル讀
者ハ或ハ條約ノ運命ニ付一點ノ疑ヲ挾ミ或ハ樞
府ト政府トノ衝突ヲ危クニ至リ各種團體ニシテ
此ノ間隙ニ乘リテ策動ヲ試ムルモノ續出シ又種々ノ
文書中ニハ怪文書ト目セラルモノアリ公然又ハ秘密
裡ニ各方面ニ頒布セラシ離間中傷至ニサルナキ
ノ狀況ナリキ爲ニ人ヲシテ其ノ眞偽是非ヲ辨別セ
シタルコト能ハサルカ如キ狀態ニシテ其ノ結果一般ノ
人心ヲシテ一種言フヘカラサル不安不愉快ニ陥ラシ

Dec 8 91

No. 28

メタルコトに蔽フヘカニサレ事實ナリ左キタニ社會、
人心兎角平靜沈著ヲ缺ケル今日ノ場合ニ於テ此、
如キ狀態ハ永續ハ決シテ喜フヘキコトニ非ス而モ條
約ノ運命カ未定ノ狀態ニ在ル間ハ此ノ種不安狀態
ノ終熄ハ之ヲ望ムコトヲ得サルノミナラス人心ノ不
安ハ日々ノ新聞ノ記事其ノ他種々ノ惡宣傳ニ刺戟
セラレテ益々甚シキヲ加フルノ傾向歴然タルモ、アリ
時ニ政府ノ最モ憂慮ニ堪ヘサリシコトハ財界ノ問題ナ
リ我國財界ノ現狀ハ金解禁ノ善後策ニ加フルニ世
界的大不景氣ノ影響ヲ受ケ之ニ善處セサルヘカラ
サル最モ所要ナル時ニシテ一定ノ方針ニ則リ官民一致
最善ノ努力ヲ爲スニアラサレハ或ハ國民經濟ノ前途
ヲ誤ラサルヤヲ恐ル此ノ時ニ方リ樞府對政府ノ關
係ニ因リ政界ノ不安定久シキニ涉ルニ於テ近時頗
ル神經過敏ニ陥レル財界ノ人々ハ何時政變ノ爲政
府ノ財政經濟政策ニ大ナル變更改ヲ來スヤモ知
ラズト、憂慮ヨリシテ事業界金融界ノ人々ハ安
心ニテ其ノ事業ヲ經營シ其ノ業務ニ從事スルヲ
得ス 唯手ヲ束ネテ空ニク成行ヲ傍觀スルノ
外ナキノミナラス種々ノ流言蜚語其ノ間ニ行ハ
財界ヲ惑亂シ公債ヲ始メ各種ノ有價證券市
場ハ動搖シテ毫モ安定シ難カルヘシ抑ニ政界、
不安定又ハ政變ノ思ハル如キハ平常中無事ノ際ニ
在テハ財界ニ左述重大ナル影響ヲナシ坐シタルモ今
日ノ財界ハ金解禁ノ實行セラレニヨリ未タ遠カ
ラス從テ其ノ影響自未タ鎮靜スルニ至ラサルニ加ヘテ

Doc 89 /

No. 29

前述ノ如ク世界的不景氣ノ影響相當深刻ニシテ
財界ノ人心頗ル神經過敏ト爲レリ際學者及新
聞雜誌記者ノ一部ノ間ニ從來寧ニ學究的好
奇的ニ唱ヘラレタル平價切下解禁論ナルモノ頗ニ氣
勢ヲ印メ株式市場ニ關係アル若等カ投機思
或心的ニ此ノ說ヲ利用スルニ至リタルノミナラス終ニ
政界財界ニ於テ相當ノ地位ヲ有スル一部ノ人々特
ニ財界ノ現狀及其前途ニ付大ニ悲觀的意見
ヲ有スル人等カ故意カ巨面目ナルカラ知ラサルモ
次ノ内閣ハ或ハ金ノ輸出再禁止ヲ斷行シ其ノ結果
爲替相場ノ或ル程度ニ下落シ其ノ安定セル頃ヲ
見計ヒ其ノ下落ノ程度ニ應ジテ平價ヲ切下ケテ
再ヒ金解禁ヲ實行スルノ政策ヲ取ルニ非サルカ
トノ觀測財界ノ或リ面ニ行ハルニ至リ中心之ヲ
信用スル者又之ヲ信用セサル迄モ財界ニ於ケル斯カ
ル危惧心ヲ利用シテ私利私益ヲ圖ルノ具ニ供セ
ムトスル者ヲ生シタリ此ノ如キ現象ハ識者ノ常識
ヲ以テシテハ想像スルニト能ハサル所ナルモ何分神經
ノ特ニ過敏ト爲レリ近時ノ財界ノコトナレハ此等
ノ虛實混肴ノ宣傳又ハ思惑カ案外今日ノ財界
ニ實質的ノ影響ヲ及ボスニ至リタルモノナリ而シテ
其ノ最モ顯著ナル事實ハ正貨ノ海外流出ナリ
金解禁ノ下ニ於テ上半期ノ輸入期ニ相當ノ正貨
流出アルハ怪ムニ足ラサル所ナルモ下半期出超ノ時期
ニ入リ而モ年末ノ輸入期ヲ距ルコト尚遠キ最近
ノ時機ニ於テ相當巨額ノ正貨流出ヲ見タルハ其

Dac 89 /

No. 30

原因他ニモ存スヘシト雖モ、政界財界、人々カ政府ニ於
 ケル條約審議、進行、遲々トシテ、因リ種々、臆設ヲ送ラシテ
 政界ノ不安ヲ傳ヘ大ヨリ联想シテ、金、輸出再禁止——新平
 價解除ヲ氣構ヘテ為目相場、動搖トナリタルニ因リモト
 思惟ス故ニ、政府ノ審議ニシテ、尙此ノ上長ク決スル所ナク延イ
 テ政界ノ不安云々カニ於テ上述ノ如キ傾向ハ益々顕著トナリ
 其ノ結果財界全般ニ如クナル憂々モ現象ヲ見ルニ至ルヤモ
 測リ難シ本條約審議、成行、付政府、最モ憂慮スルニ
 實ニ此ノ憂ニ存ス幸ニ審査委員各位ニ於テ、國家ノ重キヲ
 念トシ速ニ之ヲ審議スルシ、全員一致ヲ以テ本案ヲ可決ス
 ンニ因リ、九月中旬以來ハ漸ク政界ノ不安ヲ見ルニ至リ延イ
 此ノ方面ヨリ来ル財界ノ不安ヲ除クヲ得ルニ至リタルニ、政府、
 深ク喜ブ所ナリ

二三會石里ニ了解セリ、質問ニタキニト、數々トモ審
 査委員各位ノ嚴密ナル調査カリタルコトナシ、之ヲ敬ニ且
 信ニ茲ニ賛成、意ヲ表ス
 議長(倉富)別ニ御發言ナキニ由リ、直ニ採決ニ付スヘシ
 委員會、報告、通リ賛成、各位、起立ヲ請フ
 聖上ノ御(全會一致可決)

(午後零時三十分開會)

議長 田方壽

倉富 勇三 部

書記官 長

二上 兵治

書記官

堀江 季雄
武藤 盛雄

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證 明 書

一ワシントン工文書局 第 號
國際檢察部 第八九一號

長據及ビ公正ニ由スル證明

余、鈴木知男ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ樞密院事務官トシテ、日本政府ト公的ニ在ルモノナルコト、並ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラレタル、一八六頁ヨリ成ル、千九百三十年ノ昭和五年ノ十月一日附、下記題名、即チ千九百三十年一ロンドンニ作算係納御批准ノ件ノ文書ノ保管ニ任ジ居ルコトラ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナルコト、並ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類及ビ其ノ一部ナルコトラ證明ス。(若シテラベ領香又ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ其ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ特記スベシ) 樞密院事務所

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十一年ノ十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

管該官更署名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證

人

鈴木知男

樞密院事務官

J. A. CURTIS 2d Lt

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公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、^{ジエー。エー。カトナ} J. A. CURTIS、余が聯合國最高指揮官總司令
部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、並ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ
余が公府上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタ
ルモノナルコトラ茲ニ證明ス

千九百四十六年／昭和二十一年／十月一日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名 欄

J. A. CURTIS 2d LT

右ノ者ノ公的資格

INVESTIGATOR

證 人

RICHARD H. LARSH